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Abstract 
This study set out to assess the credibility of Egyptian talk show host Tawfik Okasha 
and how it affects the political participation tendencies of his viewers. The results 
showed that he was highly rated on the components of expertness and trustworthiness 
and moderately on the component of goodwill. Overall, Tawfik Okasha was perceived 
as a credible communicator. Tawfik Okasha’s credibility varied among the different 
educational levels. He is mostly credible among the “illiterate” and the “less than high 
school” categories. Compared to the rest of the educational levels, highly educated 
people do not perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible.  Perceiving Tawfik Okasha as 
credible was found to be associated with active political participation among the 
respondents. The results also showed that respondents who perceive Okasha as credible 
are more likely to vote for the candidates he supports. Okasha’s use of nationalist 
discourse has been shown to enhance his credibility.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................ 1 
 1.1 Overview of Talk shows in the Arab World and Egypt …………….3 
 1.2 The importance of the Study…………………………………………10 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework……………11 
 2.1 Overview of Political Communication and Its Effects………………11  
 2.2 The effect of Television on political participation…………………18 
 2.3 The Relationship between Internet Use and Political Participation..22 
 2.4 Social media and Political participation in Egypt…………………..25 
 2.5 The Story of Tawfik Okasha…………………………………………28 
 2.6 Tawfik Okasha in his own words…………………………………….34 
 2.7 Source Credibility Theory…………………………………………….38 
Chapter 3: Methodology…………………………………………………44 
 3.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses………………………………..45 
 3.2 Type of Sample……………………………………………………….49 
 3.3 Sample Size……………………………………………………………50 
 3.4 Data Collection………………………………………………………..50 
 3.5 Pretesting………………………………………………………………50 
 3.6 Survey Design………………………………………………………….51 
  Chapter 4: Results………………………………………………………53 
 4.1 Sample Characteristics………………………………………………..53 
 4.2 Type and frequency of Media Use……………………………………56 
 4.3 Analysis of respondents’ Political Participation Levels……………..60 
 4.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses Testing………………………....69 
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion…………………………………….84  
 5.1 Discussion and Conclusion…………………………………………….84 
 5.2 Limitations of the study………………………………………………..89 
 5.3 Recommendations for Future Studies…………………………………90 
 
   
 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………..91 
Appendices………………………………………………………………115 
Appendix A: English Version of Survey……………………………….115 
Appendix B: Arabic Version of Survey………………………………..121 
Appendix C: CAPMAS Approval………………………………………128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Do you think that political participation is important for Egypt's future?   
            60 
Table 2: Did you vote in the 2012 presidential elections?       60 
Table 3: Who did you vote for in the 2012 presidential elections?   61 
Table 4: Did you participate in the January 2014 constitutional referendum? 62 
Table 5: Did you vote in favor of the constitution or against it?    62 
Table 6: Did you participate in the protests of the January 25th revolution?  63 
Table 7: Did you participate in the protests of the June 30th revolution?  63 
Table 8: Participation in the January revolution Vs. Participation in the June 30th 
revolution           64 
Table 9: Responding to the call of Tawfik Okasha to protest on June 30th          65 
Table 10: Responding to the call of Tamarrod to protest on June 30th                 65 
Table 11: Responding to the call of a political party to protest on June 30th    65 
Table 12: Likert scale statements about political participation   66 
Table 13: Are you going to participate in the upcoming presidential elections?   67 
Table 14: If you are going to participate, who are you going to vote for?    67 
Table 15: Do you have anything else that you would like to say about T.V talk 
show host Tawfik Okasha?            68 
Table 16: Distribution of respondents’ rating of Tawfik Okasha’s expertness   69 
Table 17: The mean score of Tawfik Okasha’s expertness          70 
Table 18: Distribution of respondents’ rating of Tawfik Okasha’s Trustworthiness   
           70 
Table 19: The mean score of Tawfik Okasha’s trustworthiness     71 
   
 
Table 20: Distribution of respondents’ rating of Tawfik Okasha’s Goodwill   71 
Table 21: The mean score of Tawfik Okasha’s Goodwill    71 
Table 22 The mean score of Tawfik Okasha’s overall Credibility   72 
Table 23: Relationship between liking nationalist discourse and perceiving 
Okasha as a credible communicator       74 
Table 24: The relationship between perceiving Okasha as a credible 
communicator and believing that political participation is important for Egypt’s 
future                        76 
Table25 The relationship between Tawfik Okasha’s credibility and voting for the 
candidate he supported in the 2012 presidential elections    27 
Table 26: The relationship between Tawfik Okasha’s credibility and voting for the 
candidates he supports in the upcoming presidential elections       78 
Table 27 How the respondents felt about participating in a protests organized by 
Tawfik Okasha          79 
Table 28: Relationship between the mean scores of Tawfik Okasha’s credibility 
and attending a protest he organized                  80 
Table 29: Credibility means according to the Level of Education    81 
Table 30: The mean scores of Tawfik Okasha’s credibility among the highly 
educated respondents Vs. The rest of the educational levels altogether      82 
Table 31: Okasha’s credibility and the use of the Internet by the Youth   83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
List of figures 
Figure 1 Banner from the Abbasiya protest in December 2011 displaying four 
Egyptian talk show hosts in nooses                                                                           32 
Figure 2: Distribution of respondents’ age                                                              53 
Figure 3: Employment status of respondents                                                          54 
Figure 4: Distribution of respondents’ monthly income                                        55 
Figure 5: Primary Source for Political Information                                              56 
Figure 6: How many hours do you spend watching Television daily?                 57 
Figure 7: How many hours do you spend watching T.V. talk shows daily?        58 
Figure 8: Frequency of watching Tawfik Okasha’s talk show “Masr Al Yom”  59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
"I will be the first to admit that getting votes and getting an audience are two 
different things. For example, a politician really can't be elected if he's hated by 
half the people. A talk show host, however, can be an overwhelming national 
phenomenon while being hated by half the people." 
Rush Limbaugh, American radio talk show host 
It seems as if Limbaugh's words were describing Egyptian talk show host 
Tawfik Okasha and his controversial character. Okasha, who hosts a daily talk show 
called "Masr Al Yom" (Egypt Today) on his privately owned T.V channel Al Faraeen, 
managed to become a national media phenomenon after the January 25th revolution. By 
just googling his name, more than 2 million results are displayed. More than ¼ of a 
million videos that feature him are uploaded on Youtube. Also there are more than 200 
pages that were created about him on Facebook. Furthermore, Okasha’s official page 
has nearly ½ of a million members. For some people, Okasha is perceived as a freedom 
fighter and for others he is only a media pundit who speaks of nothing but absurdities 
and unbelievable conspiracy theories. Until now, the latter group remains at odds with 
the former. The question then arises as to what makes Tawfik Okasha different from 
any other talk show host?  
The answer lies with the fact that Okasha has developed further the use of his 
television platform and turned it into a political one. He assumed the role of a political 
leader and called for protests to be held on several occasions under the rule of the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood, respectively.  
The most prominent protest that Okasha called for was on the night of declaring 
the winner of the 2012 presidential elections. The protest was held near the Nasr City 
Podium to support the SCAF and presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik against the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Surprisingly, hundreds of thousands of people showed up in 
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response to Okasha's call according to the estimates of Sky News Arabia (2012).  But 
it was no surprise that Tawfik Okasha's channel was shut down shortly after the Muslim 
Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi assumed presidency. According to Ahram 
Online (2012), the General Authority for Investment (GAFI) closed it down as a result 
of a lawsuit filed against Okasha accusing him of inciting violence against the 
President. The channel remained closed for six months and Okasha was back on air in 
March 2013. His criticism of the former President Mohamed Morsi and his policies 
continued and even escalated as Okasha called for another massive protest to demand 
the interference of the Armed Forces in order to end Morsi's rule. Again and on the 21st 
of June 2013, thousands of people gathered near the headquarters of the Ministry of 
Defense in response to Okasha's call. 
 Less than 10 days later, Egypt witnessed the June 30th revolution that ousted 
President Morsi and put an end to the Muslim Brotherhood's rule. Soon afterwards the 
crew members of Okasha's show celebrated the success of the revolution. More 
importantly, they declared Okasha as the "godfather and leader of the revolution". 
Now that it has been 9 months since the June 30th revolution, assessing the 
influence of Tawfik Okasha seems viable and justified. His phenomenon needs an 
objective and scientific approach. Interestingly enough, Okasha always stresses on the 
huge popularity of his channel among the Egyptians and Arabs. He repeatedly claims 
that Al Faraeen is "the most viewed channel in the Arab World", with its viewership 
exceeding 40 million viewers daily. On other occasions, Okasha would proudly say that 
on the day he organized a protest against Hillary Clinton’s visit to Egypt in July 2012, 
his channel was viewed by more than 360 million viewers worldwide.  
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On the other hand, the anti-Okasha side would usually describe him as the 
"Gaddafi of Egypt" in reference to the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi who was 
known for using bizarre expressions and unreasonable accusations in his speeches. 
Despite that, the rise of Tawfik Okasha's phenomenon and his ability to mobilize 
thousands of seemingly non-politicized citizens needs more scrutiny and research as it 
signals the introduction of new concepts into the area of political communication.  
Assuming the role of a political leader might be a manifestation of the political 
fluidity that was transmitted to the media scene in the aftermath of the January 25th 
revolution. Nevertheless, witnessing a talk show host deviating from the traditional 
values of objectivity and neutrality and turning into a political leader who organizes 
political rallies and protests is unprecedented in the history of the Egyptian media. It 
also signals the birth of a new media phenomenon that is worthy of research. Such 
research should be placed within the context of the Egyptian political scene in the 
aftermath of the January 25th revolution. For instance, the radical rise in the levels of 
political participation after the revolution cannot be ignored as Egyptians have become 
more aware and willing to participate in the political process. Tawfik Okasha might be 
one of the many reasons that made Egyptians become more active political participants 
after the revolution. This is why this study aims at assessing the credibility of Tawfik 
Okasha and whether it has an effect on the political participation levels of his viewers. 
1.1 Overview of Talk shows in the Arab World and Egypt 
The appearance of Arab private satellite channels in the 1990s marked the 
beginning of a new era, not just in the field of broadcasting, but in the social and 
political fields as well.  According to Zayani (2006), the establishment of the Qatar-
based channel Al Jazeera in 1996 redefined news programming and provided the Arab 
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audience with an unprecedented margin of freedom. This was manifested primarily in 
the format of Al Jazeera’s talk shows. These talk shows broke many social and political 
taboos that the state-owned media in the Arab world never spoke of.  
Lynch (2003) points out that the format of Al Jazeera’s talk shows shocked the 
Arab audience as it featured heated and controversial debates between different guests 
who used sharp arguments. Another reason that put the label “controversial” on these 
talk shows was that they openly discussed sensitive issues such as government 
corruption, the violations of human rights in the Arab countries, and even the 
persecution of political dissenters (Zayani, 2005).  Furthermore, Khatib (2008) argues 
that Al Jazeera’s talk shows appealed to the audience because they mainly relied on 
heated political debate and criticism instead of “polished representations of political 
rulers.” 
The “Opposite Direction” (Al Itijah Al Moakes) is perhaps the most well-known 
talk show that combines all the aforementioned characteristics. The show is hosted by 
Faissal Al Qassim. It gained its popularity because the audience was no longer satisfied 
with what the official TV channels were offering. Al Qassim (2005) believes that his 
show is watched by millions of Arabs and that it plays an important role in shaping 
what he calls the ”pan-Arab public opinion”. 
 Hafez (2008) highlights the role of talk shows in fostering political 
participation as people get to express their opinions in the “Arab virtual parliaments” 
of talk shows. That might be the first step toward achieving a real political change one 
day. Despite the fact that Arab mass media do not exert large influence on the political 
decisions made by the ruling elites, they do contribute to shaping the public opinion 
and political culture of the Arab viewers.  
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Lynch (2006) argues that political talk shows are important because they rely 
on the notion of disagreement which is essential to building a pluralistic society. 
Nevertheless, talk shows alone are never going to be enough for sound democratic 
transition. 
As for Egypt, the region’s pioneering country in the field of broadcasting, 
moving into the era of private satellite broadcasting took place in the late 1990s. The 
interactive feature of viewer call-ins attracted Egyptians as they have not witnessed it 
before. In other words, talk shows became the “new political currency” as it gave the 
Egyptian audience the chance to express their opinions and criticize the government 
policies (Mabrouk, 2010)   
Historically, Egypt was the first Arab country to launch its own satellite Nilesat 
101 in 1998. It was also the first to establish a media “free zone” known as the Media 
Production City. A complex of modern studios was built inside the city for satellite 
channels to broadcast from, under the jurisdiction of the Egyptian state (Sakr, 2001).  
In the wake of the new millennium, the Egyptian government started granting 
licenses to private satellite channels. The business elite welcomed this step as it helped 
them maintain their business interests and at the same time strengthen their relations 
with the ruling political elite (Sakr, 2010).   
The first three private stations established were Dream TV in 2001, El Mehwar 
TV in 2002 and OTV in 2007. Ahmed Bahgat owned Dream TV, Hassan Rateb owned 
El Mehwar, while Naguib Sawiris owned OTV, however he sold it later in 2012 to the 
Tunisian businessman Tariq Bin Ammar (Sky News Arabia, 2012) 
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 According to Sakr (2010b), the owners of these private channels did not 
prioritize practicing the freedom of expression because they were aware of the 
restrictions that have been imposed on them in order to be allowed to operate in the first 
place. Thus they have always equated the freedom of expression with privatization.  
However, the success of these stations was mainly due to the ability of its talk 
show hosts to discuss the most pertinent and popular issues. Talk shows on the private 
satellite channels became a means for displaying the “nation’s dirty laundry”. An 
example of that is the subsidized bread crisis that took place in 2009. The Minister of 
Social Solidarity at that time Aly Moselhy was hosted on Lamees El Hadidy’ talk show 
and viewers called and directed heavy criticism to the minister. Furthermore, politicians 
used the platform of talk shows to reach the audience. For instance, Ayman Nour, the 
former head of Al Ghad party appeared on Al Ashera Massan hosted at that time by 
Mona El Shazli after the clashes that took place in the party’s headquarters (Mabrouk, 
2010) 
Even though the media zone is controlled by the state as the Egyptian Radio and 
Television Union (ERTU) owns 50% of its shares, talk shows were given a big margin 
of freedom as they were permitted to criticize the state and discuss controversial issues 
(Amin, 2006).  On the other hand, Khamis (2008) argues that talk shows acted as 
“safety valves” as they helped release the anger of Egyptians at the political and social 
injustices since they were denied from practicing their political rights. 
Elsayed’s (2007) study shows that Egyptian youth turn to satellite television to 
search for well-made political talk shows that discuss important issues related to their 
country and religion. Furthermore, the study reveals that Egyptian youth prefers 
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watching Arabic talk shows over Western ones because they are believed to be more 
accurate in their presentation of the problems that the youth suffer from.  
 In December 2010 and right before the revolution of January 25th ,the Cairo 
Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) issued a detailed and valuable report titled 
“Media and Parliamentary Elections in Egypt: Evaluation of Media Performance in the 
Parliamentary Elections”. The report gave a detailed account of the media performance 
during the 2010 parliamentary elections and also the vicious attacks on the media before 
the elections started. The latter was mainly directed at popular talk shows. The first talk 
show that was suspended was “Cairo Today” (Al Qahira Al Yawm), which is hosted 
by Amr Adib and according to the report has “a substantial impact on public opinion 
and debate.”  
 The second incident mentioned by the report is the suspension of Ibrahim Eissa, 
the famous Egyptian journalist, who co-hosted a talk show named “Our Country in 
Vernacular” (Baladna Bel Masry) with Reem Maged on ONTV. According to Naguib 
Sawiris, Eissa was removed from the show because the advertisers believed that Eissa 
caused problems by crossing the red lines in his criticism of the regime. The same thing 
goes for the four religious TV channels, namely Al Nas, Al Hafez, Al Khalijia and Al 
Seha Wal Jamal, which were shut down in October 2010 right before the elections.  
 The report attributed these moves to the regime’s strategy to silence the media 
through narrowing the margin of freedom given to them earlier. It was the talk shows 
that reported on the violations made during the 2005 parliamentary elections.  
 Not all talk shows were of good and professional quality. According to Hamada 
(2008), the content of the Arab satellite channels’ shows relied on cheap entertainment 
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and political propaganda, with the possible exception of Al Asherah Massan on Dream 
2, 90 minutes and Hewar on Hot Fire on El Mehwar, and Kalam Rosas on Dubai TV.  
In post January 25th Egypt, the media scene entered a phase of intense fluidity 
as the restrictions imposed on licensing new satellite channels were lifted. As a result, 
16 new channels were established in less than 4 months following the January 25th 
revolution (Madkour, 2011). Watching talk shows have become dominant among 
Egyptians. The most popular shows according to Iskandar (2012) were Yousri Fouda’s 
Akher Kalam (Last Words) and Reem Maged’s Balandna Bil Masry (Our country in 
Egyptian). Their main competitors were Mona Al Shazli’ Al Ashera Masaan (10:00 
PM) and Moatza Al Demerdahs’s 90 Dakeeka (90 minutes). 
 According to El Khalili (2011), some talk shows like Akher Kalam became 
popular as they played a role in exposing corruption. An example of this is the 
resignation of Egypt’s chief forensics doctor after a series of episodes on Yousri 
Fouda’s talk show “Akher Kalam” were aired in May, 2011. The episodes exposed the 
role the chief forensics doctor in writing a forged report about the death of Khaled Said, 
the icon of the revolution in June 2010. 
In her comprehensive study about the Egyptian media after the January 25th 
revolution, El Issawi (2013) provides an extensive review of Egyptian talk shows and 
the performance of their presenters. Issawi argues that “talk show hosts have become 
arbiters of public opinion and contributors to shaping the political discourse”. Talk 
show presenters have seemingly gained more courage in confronting politicians. An 
example of this was when the Prime Minster at that time Ahmed Shafik appeared with 
Youssri Fouda and Reem Maged and was fiercely criticized on air. The next day he 
resigned.  
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Interestingly, the role of the talk show’s presenter was greatly developed as his 
personal views were integrated into the news reports. The presenter would even support 
certain candidates in the elections. For example, the Salafi talk show host Kahled 
Abdullah who appeared on Al Nas channel believed that his overt support for Salafi 
candidates in the parliamentary elections in 2011 was one of the main reasons that made 
people vote for them.  
Issawi surveyed a number of prominent talk show hosts to assess how they 
perceived the role they played in the aftermath of the revolution. Mahmoud Saad rejects 
the neutrality stance and believes that he should voice out his opinions clearly. The 
same opinion is shared by Tamer Amin, the host of “Saa’ Mareya” on Rotana Masreya, 
who argues that “There is a difference between the public opinion in the West and that 
in Arab countries. Here, they need to be told what to think. They need guidance. I try 
not to express my opinion but I received phone calls from my audience asking me to 
give them advice.” 
 Another example of a talk show host who assumed the role of an activist is 
Reem Maged who became well-known for her support for the revolution and even 
protesting in Tahrir Square. She believes that talk shows are a “powerful weapon” that 
she cannot give up and instead she chooses to use it to serve her cause. 
 On the other side of the spectrum, talk show host Sherif Amer refuses to assume 
the role of an activist and asserts that when talk show hosts give up their objectivity, 
they become more potential targets for blackmail by the regime. 
 Commenting on the role of talk show hosts after the revolution, Nasser (2011) 
believes that the private satellite channels have drowned in chaos. This is evident as 
talk show hosts displayed a lack of professionality and that their “stardom” was made 
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up. That is why the researcher asks for a critical evaluation of the performance of talk 
show hosts during and after the revolution. 
1.2 The Importance of the study 
The significance of this study stems from the fact it is the first study to focus on 
the effect of a single talk show host on the political attitudes and actions of his audience. 
Moreover, it contributes to the growing body of literature on the effect of the media on 
the people’s political participation.  
Given that Egypt has witnessed a most intense and polarized political climate 
following the events of the January 25th revolution, the interrelationships between 
media and politics cannot be disregarded. These three years have also witnessed a 
substantial evolvement in the role of journalists and talk show hosts who assumed the 
role of political activists rather than adhering to the traditional role of being watchdogs 
(Elmasry, 2013). Tawfik Okasha is therefore chosen as a case study since he embodies 
this fact of a talk show host who turned into a political activist. Source credibility theory 
will be used as a basis for this study as it aims to assess if there is a relationship between 
Okasha’s credibility as a talk show host and the political participation levels of his 
audience. Hence this study is also expected to: 
1.  Add to the existing literature about the effects of source credibility on 
persuasion. 
2. Suggest new ways to look at the role of source credibility in the field of political 
communication. 
3. Serve as a starting point for studying the role of credible communicators in the 
times of pivotal changes, with special emphasis on the Egyptian media scene. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Overview of Political Communication and Its Effects  
The discipline of political communication emerged in 1956 with the attempts to 
assess the relationship between formal governmental institutions and the voting 
behavior of the public (Nimmo & Sanders, 1981). It currently includes the 
consequences of all political communication messages tailored by personal and 
institutional sources and how they affect the attitudes of the media audiences (McLeod, 
Kosicki, & McLeod, 2009). According to Crigler (1996), the media effects models have 
always been the gateway to studying political communication. The earliest model of 
media effects, known as the “Magic Bullet” or the “Hypodermic Needle approach”, 
assumed that the media messages are powerful and immediate in their effect on the 
behavior of the audience. Then along came Harold Laswell in 1964 with his “flow of 
communication” model that assumed that communication effects are not inevitable and 
that there are several other factors that impact the message. The model emphasized the 
importance of the message components and the conditions under which the receiver is 
exposed to the message. This approach dominated the study of persuasion and opinion 
change for many decades as it highlighted that people’s attitudes and opinions can be 
changed through well-crafted messages.  
Later on in 1972, McCombs and Shaw (1972) introduced their famous agenda-
setting theory which maintained that the media is highly successful in influencing the 
public agenda and deciding which issues are important and which are not. They 
emphasized the undeniable role of the media in the political process in the concluding 
part of their study by stating that “the media are the major primary sources of national 
political information; for most, mass media provide the best-and only-easily available 
approximation of ever-changing political realities”. That is why a central theme in the 
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field of political communication has to do with the notion of public opinion. Similarly, 
Zukin (1981) argued that even though it is difficult to determine the exact effects that 
the media have on the public opinion, identifying how the media affect the public 
opinion in general seems a lot easier.  In other words, the media play a critical role in 
providing the public with information about political issues. Politicians in turn are 
highly aware of that critical role played by the newspapers and television in the process 
of setting the public’s agenda. This leads them consequently to design their political 
strategies according to the public’s issue priorities (Walgrave & Aelst, 2006). 
 The effect of political communication on the public opinion was examined in 
different ways. For example, Chong and Druckman (2010) studied the effect of 
competing messages on the public over the course of a campaign and how the timing 
of their exposure to the messages affect their attitudes. An experiment was conducted 
and it showed that when people receive competing messages at the same time, they can 
easily evaluate the opposing arguments and make up their minds about the issue. 
However, when the competing messages are received across different periods, people 
tend to forget the argument made at the beginning. The experiment showed that 
people’s attitudes were affected by the timing of exposure to the message. Moreover, 
Nir and Druckman (2008) examined the effect of political campaigns on the timing of 
voters’ decision. Their study focused on the ambivalent voter who had not decided yet 
who to vote for. The experiment they conducted showed that when ambivalent voters 
were exposed to a mixed flow of messages, it took them much longer to make up their 
minds. 
As mentioned before, the agenda-setting theory has always been central to the 
study of political communication as it explains how the role of the media in shaping the 
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public opinion.  Political parties all over the world are also highly aware of that role. 
That is why they rely on the media to design their campaigns’ strategies and policies. 
In their study of the 2007 national election campaign in Denmark, Hopmann, 
Præstekær, Vliegenthart and de Vreese (2010) found out that the parties of the Social 
Democrats and Liberals were successful at influencing the issue agenda in the news 
media through the press releases they published. 
 In their interesting study about the increasing influence of the media during 
election times in Denmark and Germany during the last 20 years, Hes and Hoppman 
(2013) found support for the “mediatization hypothesis”. The process of mediatization 
refers to the increasing media influence on the society thorough controlling the 
depiction of reality. The study showed that the media’s coverage of elections in both 
countries have entailed the horse-race technique (showing that a candidate is leading 
the race and the other one as losing it), and personalization (giving most of the coverage 
to the top politicians at the expense of issues and parties’ strategies). 
 Walgrave (2008) also discussed the ability of the media to set the political 
agenda in Belgium. The author conducted a survey among Belgian journalists and 
politicians to measure their perception of the agenda-setting power of the media. The 
results showed that both journalists and politicians believe in the media’s powerful 
effect on setting the political agenda.  
Furthermore Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2010) investigated the effect the 
media have on the choice of issues to deal with by Belgian parliamentarians. Their 
analysis proved that the media have a considerable influence on the agenda of Belgian 
MPs. Nevertheless, there are some factors that moderate the agenda-setting function of 
the media. For example, the opposition is more influenced by the media coverage of 
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events than the majority party. Also the size of the party is another factor as the smaller 
parties tend to have its political agenda set by the media more than the bigger ones. 
 Van Dalen and Van Aelst (2014) studies the agenda-setting function of the 
media in eight West European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, the  Netherlands and the United Kingdom. They surveyed political journalists 
in the 8 countries in order to examine the relationship between the media and the 
political process. The results were interesting as they showed that the “institutional 
arrangements” of each political system affected the agenda setting function of the 
media. In Germany, Spain and the UK where the executive power is concentrated in 
the hand of one or two parties, the government is the more powerful than the media in 
setting the agenda. On the other hand, the weak concentration of power in Belgium, 
Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands leads the media to have a stronger agenda setting 
power than the government. 
 Sheafer and Weimann (2005) employed a content analysis of the media 
coverage of four Israeli elections to examine the relationship between the media agenda 
and the public agenda. They examined the process of agenda building, agenda setting 
and priming. Their results showed that the voting behavior was influenced by the 
agenda setting function of the media as they respondents voted for the candidates who 
adopted the media agenda in determining what issues were important. 
 Min (2004) studied the agenda-setting function of the media during the 2000 
Korean Congressional elections. The study examined the political parties’ agenda, the 
civic agenda and the news agenda. The findings indicated that the media was more 
influential in setting the agenda and determining which issues were more important and 
that in turn affected the voting behavior of Korean citizens. The study also showed that 
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the role of political parties in setting the agenda seems limited when compared to the 
media. 
 In the United States, Sun and Weaver (2005) conducted a study about the effect 
of media agenda setting on the public opinion during the 2ooo presidential elections. 
Their study examined the first and second levels of agenda setting. The findings showed 
that the cumulative news salience of the candidates and their attributes caused a change 
in the public opinion. Furthermore, the more a candidate received a positive coverage 
over time, the more he was supported by the public opinion.  
Shehata and Strömbäck (2013) used a panel survey and a content analysis of 
Swedish media coverage of the 2010 elections to examine if the traditional media still 
possess the powerful function of setting the public agenda, especially with the advent 
of the online news media. Their results showed that the traditional media still influence 
the public agenda, however, this influence seems to be weakened by the use of online 
news media.  
Strömbäck and Nord (2006) conducted an interesting study to examine the 
relationship between journalists who are considered to be the media gatekeepers and 
politicians. They used a survey, content analysis and interviews to decipher the 
dynamics of the relationship between journalists and their political sources. The study 
was conducted during the 2002 Swedish national election. The findings supported the 
idea that journalists exert more influence on the news content than politicians.  
To examine the media agenda-setting power from the perspective of politicians,   
Van Aelst and Walgrave (2011) surveyed MPs from Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Denmark to see how they view the effect of media on their political agenda. Their 
findings showed that politicians think very highly of the media and have a strong belief 
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that it sets the public’s agenda to a great extent. This makes them more willing to adopt 
and deal with the issues that are deemed important by the media.  
 All the previous studies showed that the media is perceived to be powerful in 
its effect on voters’ decisions. This perception might indicate the existence of a third-
person effect. The third- person effect is a hypothesis that postulates that people are 
more likely to believe that the media have greater effects on others than on themselves 
and therefore are more likely to favor censorship to “protect” others (Davison, 1983). 
One of the consequences of the third person effect is the development of hostile media 
bias phenomenon. This phenomenon refers to a tendency to believe that the media is 
being biased against one’s favorite candidate and that would certainly affect other 
people’s perception of that candidate (Perloff, 2009, p.261).  
Gardikiotis (2004) examined both the third person effect and the hostile media 
bias phenomenon in the context of the 2004 Greek National election. The results of the 
survey he conducted showed that the third-person effect existed among the respondents 
who believed that the media campaign will have a greater effect on the voting choices 
of others than on themselves. Also respondents who belonged to certain parties 
demonstrated a belief that the media campaigns were unfair toward their parties. This 
validated the existence of the hostile media bias perception. 
Similarly, Wei and Lo (2007) checked for the existence of a third-person effect 
resulting from political attack ads during the U.S. 2004 presidential elections. Their 
results validated the third-person hypothesis as respondents perceived the political 
attack ads to be significantly more harmful on others than on themselves. The results 
also indicated that the respondents supported imposing restrictions on such ads. 
Another study that explored the same area was Wei, Chai and Lo’s (2011) study of the 
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effect of polls conducted during the 2008 presidential election on the voter attitudes. 
The study showed that the respondents perceived others to be more likely affected by 
election polls than themselves. The results also indicated that even though the election 
polls showed Barack Obama leading the race, Obama’s supporters believed that the 
polls favored their opponent John McCain. In addition, Brubaker (2011) examined the 
third-person effect through the scope of celebrity endorsements during the 2004 and 
2008 presidential elections. The results showed that the both Democrats and the 
Republicans reported that their voting choice was not affected by celebrity 
endorsements, but they assumed that other people would be affected by such 
endorsements. Hence a third-person effect took place as both parties assumed that 
“undesirable messages” will affect the public. 
 In Sweden, Johansson (2002) studied the impact of the third-person effect on 
shaping political attitudes. The study showed that the respondents believed that media 
play a critical role in shaping the political attitudes of others more than on themselves. 
Furthermore, they believed that the media had a small role in shaping their political 
attitudes and reported that they relied more on their personal experience rather than the 
media. In the United States, Banning (2006) argued that the third person perception is 
most likely to vary according to political affiliation (democrats and republicans) and 
that the third-person effect have an impact on political participation. The findings 
showed that people who have high third-person perception were not active political 
participants. Also the republicans were shown to high higher third-person perception 
than the democrats. Another study that dealt with the relationship between the third-
person effect and political participation was done by Golan, Banning and Lundy (2004) 
about the 2004 presidential elections in the U.S. The study focused on the perceptual 
and behavioral consequences of the third person effect. One of its intriguing findings 
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was that the more a person was exposed to political advertising, the more likely he was 
to vote in the elections. In other words, the third-person effect has been noticed to 
motivate people to vote. This study brings us to one of the most important concepts in 
the field of political communication: political participation. 
2.2 The effect of Television on political participation 
Interestingly, there were various ways used by scholars to measure political 
participation. While the majority chose to define political participation in terms of 
voting preferences, party membership, contacting officials, signing petitions, 
participating in rallies and demonstrations (Hofstetter et.al, 1994; Putnam, 1995; 
Norris, 1996; Pinkleton et.al, 1998; Wilkins, 2000; Scheufele, 2000; Kwak et.al, 2004), 
there were others who opted for counting on attitudinal measures like political trust, 
political efficacy and how people felt about politicians to examine the citizens' political 
participation (Kern,1997; Newton, 1999). Additionally, Gil de Zuniga (2011) noted that 
political participation is dependent on "informational media use and interpersonal 
discussions about politics". 
That being said, it is important to highlight the challenging fact that of all kinds 
of political participation, voting behavior gives the least amount of information about 
the effects of political communication (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Attending 
a rally, for instance, can be a better indicator of citizens' political engagement (Moy, 
Torres, Tanaka & McCluskey, 2005). Similarly, Marsh and Kaase (as cited in Quaranta, 
2012) differentiated between two types of political participation. The first one is 
conventional political participation. It refers to engaging in politics through voting and 
participating in other procedures of the electoral process. On the other hand, 
unconventional political participation refer to “the use of tactics as petitions, 
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demonstrations, boycotts, rent or tax strikes, unofficial industrial strikes, occupations 
of buildings, blocking of traffic, damage to property, and personal violence”. The media 
have been cited to have an effect on the political participation of citizens. 
According to Cho (2005), watching television news and interpersonal 
discussions influenced the voters' choices in the 2000 presidential election campaign 
through shaping the psychological traits used in judging the candidates. Moreover, 
Livingstone and Markham (2008) found a positive correlation between media use and 
political participation among the UK citizens. Also Quintelier and Hooghe's (2011) 
study about the impact of television on the political participation of Belgian adolescents 
found a positive link between the two.  
Norris (2000) rigorously asserted that media, with special reference to news 
media, have made people more knowledgeable and more politically active. This 
challenges the "media malaise theory" that the American political scientist Michael 
Robinson came up with in the 1970s. Robinson (1976) hypothesized that the amount of 
news coverage that people receive has negatively affected the levels of trust in 
politicians and government, and hence decreased the levels of citizens' political 
participation. Notable scholars reevaluated the media malaise theory and concluded that 
the media do have a clear and undeniable impact on raising the political awareness of 
the audience and hence their political participation (Bennett, Rhine, Flickinger, & 
Bennett, 1999; Newton, 1999; Lee, 2005; Stromback & Shehata, 2010).  
In their comprehensive study about the effect of the media on political activity, 
Stromback and Shehata (2010) conducted a three-wave panel study of the 2006 
Swedish election campaign. The sample was diverse as it included people from the age 
of 18 till 74 years old. The results demonstrated that political interest is raised by 
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exposure to public service broadcast and that people who are already politically 
interested will seek media exposure. 
Furthermore, Martin’s (2008) study stresses the importance of the mass media 
in inciting political participation. Through a content analysis, he shows that the media 
is a force of political mobilization and that bad or negative news about issues makes 
the citizens more aware and therefore raises the levels of political participation. 
Television is a rich medium that since its invention, scholars have been debating 
its effect on the audience. Various theories were crafted to explain its effects, most 
notably Gerbner’s cultivation theory and Noelle Neumann’s spiral of silence (Severin 
and Tankard, 2001). Early studies proved that there was a positive relationship between 
television and high voter turnout (Glaser, 1965). 
The study of television effects extended to talk shows. The introduction of 
television talk shows took place in the U.S. in 1951. This trend became very successful 
as talk show production proved to be cheaper to produce than other kinds of 
programming and at the same time appealed to large numbers of the audience. In the 
late 1990s, the American talk shows started to be syndicated to international audiences 
and local broadcasters in each country started to mimic the American talk shows style 
(Hume, 1995).  
Establishing a link between watching talk shows and active political 
participation has been discussed by many studies. For example, Hoffman and Young 
(2011) examined the effect of watching parody and satire on political participation. 
Through conducting a survey, they proved that there were significant effects on the 
levels of political participation of the respondents caused by watching satire like “The 
Daily Show” and “The Colbert Report”. Hoffman and Thomson (2009) showed that 
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watching late night T.V positively affected high school students’ political efficacy and 
hence their civic participation.  
Moy, Xenos and Hess (2005) based their study on the assumption that the 
audience have turned to non-traditional or softer sources for political information. Their 
study examined “The Daily Show” and some of the politically-oriented episodes of 
“Oprah”. A positive link was found between watching that kind of content and 
enhanced political participation. However, the effect differed according to race, age and 
income. The political content on Oprah Winfrey’s show received a lot of attention from 
scholars. Baum and Jamison (2006) argued that watching Oprah’s show by the 
politically inattentive citizens helped them vote consistently for candidates that 
reflected their own preferences than those who did not. 
Added to this is Parkin’s (2010) study of the effect of the appearance made by 
John Kerry, the Democratic presidential candidate at the time, on the Late Show with 
David Letterman in 2004. Through conducting an experiment, Parkin showed that the 
appearance of candidates on talk shows positively affected the political knowledge of 
the disinterested viewers and made them recall important political information. Baum 
(2005) set out to examine the reasons why political candidates appeared on talk shows 
like Oprah and Rosie O’Donnell, and the effect that had on the viewers’ voting 
preferences. A content analysis and a survey were conducted to examine the issue. The 
results showed that politically unaware citizens were more affected by the appearance 
of candidates on these shows, in terms of their voting choices, than politically aware 
ones.  
Nevertheless, these studies focused mainly on the content of talk shows rather 
than the credibility of the communicator. Other studies examined the character of 
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famous talk shows hosts like Oprah Winfrey, but without tying it to political awareness 
and participation (Hill and Zillman, 1999; Peck 2002; Wilf & Illouz, 2008; Prarkins, 
2010) 
2.3 The Relationship between Internet Use and Political Participation 
In reference to the proliferation of Internet use, Blumler (2001) notes that we 
are currently living in the age of "communication abundance”. As a result, the audience 
was given a more active role and that in turn forced the political elites to reshape their 
political communication strategies and techniques in response to the growing 
competition.  
Numerous studies have been conducted to assess the role of the Internet in 
inciting political participation. Best and Wade (2009) examined the relationship 
between the Internet and democracy through a comprehensive analysis of data sets from 
188 countries. The variables used by the researchers included the nation’s GDP, the 
level of democratization and the Internet penetration levels. Two different periods of 
time are compared. The first one extends from 1992 to 2002 and the second one from 
2001 to 2002. Interestingly, analysis of the second period which entailed high levels of 
Internet penetration showed that Internet usage was correlated with an increase in the 
levels of political participation.   
 Polat (2005) identified 3 potential functions for the Internet that might influence 
the levels of political participation. They are the use of the Internet as a source for 
political information, a communication medium, and a virtual public sphere. The article 
examines each of the three functions and how they affect political participation. 
However, the effect of the Internet on people’s political participation remain debatable 
as no direct link could be established between the two. Furthermore, questions about 
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the Internet’s effects on the participatory inequalities has been risen. Some scholars 
argued that it increased the levels of political participation among the youth. On the 
other hand, there were scholars who argued that the Internet has deepened the digital 
divide as it lead the  people who are already more informed and interested in politics to 
become more active, and those who neither have access nor are interested in politics 
became less active (Anduiza, Cantijoch & Gallego, 2009). Several studies started to 
examine the effect of the Internet on political participation more closely and come up 
with significant, yet contradictory results. 
 Through a secondary analysis of Taiwan’s 2004 Social Change Survey, Wang 
(2007) reached the conclusion that the Internet not only had positive effects on political 
participation, but on political attitudes as well. The results showed that the more a 
person expresses his/her political views online, the more likely they will demonstrate 
high levels of political trust and political participation. 
 Quintelier and Vissers (2008) conducted a secondary analysis of the Belgian 
youth survey that included a representative sample of 6,330 participants and showed 
that spending more time on the Internet does not guarantee active political participation 
among the youth. It mostly depends on the kind of activities they engage in online that 
determines their political involvement. Blogging, following the news and forwarding 
e-mails with political content are the kind of activities that correlate with active political 
participation. Calenda and Meijer (2009) also showed that there is a correlation between 
Internet use and political participation. Online political participation correlates with 
offline participation and vice versa. In Germany, Czernich (2012) wanted to examine 
if the Internet availability and usage affects voter turnout or not. The results of his study 
showed that voter participation increased in areas with high DSL rates. 
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A common finding among these studies is that the Internet has provided the 
youth with new opportunities to engage in politics and become active political 
participants (Oser, Hooghe & Marien, 2012). Consequently, the role of the social media 
in increasing the political participation of the youth cannot be ignored. 
The first major political event that brought the role of the social media to 
people’s attention was the Barack Obama presidential campaign in 2008. The use of 
the Internet and especially the new media websites like Facebook and MySpace was 
one of the main reasons for the success of Obama’s campaign which relied on them 
heavily to reach the grassroots level (Levenshus, 2010). The campaign managed to 
reach the users of the social networking websites and make them politically engaged, 
hence increasing their levels of political activism. That was one of the key reasons that 
led to Obama’s historical victory (Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011). Even the 
traditional media dealt with the social media seriously and reported daily on some of 
the news items circulated on the latter (Metzgar & Maruggi, 2009) 
Xenosa, Vromenb & Loaderc (2014) examined the impact of social media use 
on political engagement in three advanced democracies: Australia, the U.S. and the 
U.K.  The study focused on the youth between the ages of 16 and 29 years old. The 
results reflected a positive relationship between social media use and political 
engagement. The study also showed that there is a positive correlation between the 
socioeconomic status of the person and his/her levels of political engagement. The 
higher the socioeconomic status, the more politically engaged the individual will be. 
 Moreover, Dong, Toney & Giblin (2010) relied on measuring political 
knowledge, political interest, and political participation to assess the effect of social 
networking websites in the area of political communication.  Their findings indicated 
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that dependency on social networking websites fostered more political engagement and 
participation among the youth. Within the same line comes Schuster’s (2013) study of 
the relationship between social media use and young women’s political participation in 
New Zealand. The study employed a qualitative method as it interviewed 40 women. 
The results indicate that young women do use social media websites for political 
activities due to the ease of access and cheapness.  
Scherman and Arriagada (2012) chose to make Facebook their main focus in 
order to see its impact on the political participation of Chilean youth. They conducted 
a survey that consisted of 1000 participants between the age of 18 and 29 years old. 
The hypothesis regarding the positive effect of Facebook use on political participation 
was validated as it showed that the more the individual spends time on Facebook, the 
more likely they are to vote in future elections. 
2.4 Social media and Political participation in Egypt 
Political participation levels in terms of voting rose dramatically in Egypt after the 
January 25th revolution. The highest turnout in any elections in the history of Egypt was 
witnessed in the 2011 parliamentary elections. 62% of the registered voters participated 
in the elections, whereby in the 2010 parliamentary elections held right before the 
revolution, the official voter turnout was 27.47% (IDEA, 2011)  
Added to that is the many protests that were held in the aftermath of the revolution. 
Tahrir Square, the birthplace of the revolution, witnessed 30 large scale protests known 
as the “million march man” in 2012 (Hosny, 2012). These marches were called for by 
political parties and revolutionary coalitions to call for certain demands. 
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The role of the social media in starting the revolution in the first place has been 
discussed extensively by many studies. The question of whether Facebook and Twitter 
helped mobilize the people rose to prominence as the American media was the first to 
pinpoint that the social media ignited the revolution in Egypt and Tunisia (Bashri, 
Netzley & Greiner, 2012). Khamis and Vaughn (2011) discussed the role of Facebook 
in mobilizing the youth to protest thorough analyzing the “We are All Khaled Said” 
page. The page was created after a young Egyptian man called “Khaled Said” was 
tortured to death by the police in June 2010. The administrator of the page Wael 
Ghoneim invited the members to protest against police brutality on the 25th of January, 
which is the national police day. In response to this call, more than 50,000 said that 
they will protest in the streets. The page continued to play an important role during the 
18-days of the revolution as it provided the protestors with information and 
encouragement to continue protesting.  
Before the 2011 uprising, Egyptian youth have abstained from participating in 
official politics because they thought it was obsolete under the rule of authoritarian 
regimes. However, they had positive political attitudes toward the values of democracy. 
These attitudes were translated into real political engagement in the form of protests as 
a result of using the social media websites (Sika, 2012).   
The way political activists perceived the potential role that social media websites 
could play in politics was tackled by Sayed (2011) in her survey of some young 
Egyptian activists. The results indicated that the social media were perceived as a 
substitute for the traditional media that were dominated by the government. The new 
media gave its users new opportunities to engage in politics. The results also showed a 
positive correlation between online and offline participation. The social media provided 
a tool for middle-class youth to connect with each other away from the control of the 
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government. It also allowed the online activists to reach large sectors who suffered from 
regime oppression and mobilize them to protest on January 25th (Lim, 2012). The social 
media provided an unmonitored and uncensored platform for spreading information 
and mobilization of people to protest. It was difficult for the authoritarian regimes to 
control or suppress such a platform (Douai, 2013) 
  Moreover, Tufekci and Wilson (2012) argued that the role of the social media in 
the Egyptian revolution can be seen as contributing to shaping the new system of 
political communication. The authors surveyed a sample of 1200 Egyptian protestors 
and the results showed that participants who used social media were more likely to have 
participated in the first day of protests. Also it showed that Facebook was used to 
produce and disseminate visual content about the protests.  
Nevertheless, it would be an overstatement to refer to the uprising as the “Facebook 
revolution”. According to Rine and Salem (2012), the social media only acted as a 
facilitator for the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. These revolutions took place due to 
complex geopolitical factors rather than just being ignited by Facebook and Twitter. 
This view is also shared by Halverson, Ruston, & Trethewey (2013) who studied the 
nationalist martyr narratives that emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring, with special 
reference to Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia and Khaled Said in Egypt.  
Their study focused on the role played by the social media in creating and 
disseminating these narratives and how they were used to mobilize people for political 
change. Furthermore, the traditional media are still influential as gatekeepers in 
comparison to the citizen journalism practiced on the social media. An example of this 
is the fact that Wael Ghoneim, the creator of the “We are all Khaled Said” page on 
Facebook was an anonymous figure to Egyptians until he made his famous television 
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appearance on Dream 2 TV. That was the interview that made people know more about 
the role of his Facebook page in igniting the protests and made Ghoniem gain popularity 
as one of the leaders of the revolution (Ali & Fahmy, 2013) 
2.5 The Story of Tawfik Okasha 
In their landmark work on political commentators in the U.S. in the 20th century, 
Nimmo and Newsome (1997) state that the emergence of the social role of the 
professional communicator resulted from the specialization of labor, mass persuasion, 
propaganda and advertising which were brought about by the industrial revolution. That 
role evolved over the years and with the technological advances, the phenomenon of 
political commentators was shaped. 
 Some political commentators present themselves as “standing above the 
crowd, talking down to readers, listeners, viewers and offer priestly absolutions 
originated by elites as beneficial to the masses… Others wrap themselves in the cloaks 
of sages and imply that they alone know what others simply cannot know” (Nimmo 
&Newsome, 1997) 
 An interesting question would be: Under which of these types does Tawfik 
Okasha fit in? Or is he a mix of both? In order to explore the possible answers for these 
questions, some important background information about Okasha and his television 
channel must be highlighted. 
The official documents indicate that a company by the name of "Virginia for Media 
Production and Satellite Channels " was established on the 13th of November, 2008. 
The license given to the company included permission to launch a satellite TV channel 
under the name of "Al Faraeen" (The General Authority for Investment, 2014). Al 
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Faraeen was successfully launched on the 1st of June, 2009. Tawfik Okasha who is also 
the representative of the company said that this new channel "aims at providing content 
that strengthens the Arabic cultural identity and cultivating the sense of patriotism" 
(Youm7, 2008)   
It is worth noting that the political dimension of Okasha's show was not as 
strong as it was after the January 25th revolution. Yet, the channel was shut down 
temporarily in December, 2010 because Okasha was accused of using his daily talk 
show to promote his candidacy in the parliamentary elections at that time, which he 
eventually won (Gohar, 2010)  
Okasha always affiliate himself with the peasants of Egypt and always 
emphasizes the fact that all those working in the channel are peasants. He even goes as 
far as saying that those who attack Al-Faraeen channel do so because they hate the 
working class and peasants of Egypt. (Game Over, 2012; RadarMasrTube, 2013)  
Tawfik Okasha rose to prominence in the aftermath of the January 25th 
revolution as he adopted an anti-revolutionary rhetoric. He did not acknowledge that 
what happened on the 25th of January was a revolution. Instead, it was a conspiracy led 
by Egypt's enemies, especially the Zionists and the "Freemasons" who want to destroy 
Egypt (Fisher, 2012)  
In the only detailed study made about Tawfik Okasha, Armburst (2013) argues 
that Okasha’s fame surged after the revolution as a result of the “increasingly chaotic 
post-regime environment” and his adoption of conspiracy theories and anti-
revolutionary discourse that framed the revolution as being brought about by foreign 
agents who want to destroy the Egyptian nation. Furthermore, Okasha has been widely 
believed to be working for the Military Intelligence. Armbrust’s study is an 
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ethnographic study that builds its analysis of Tawfik Okasha’s phenomenon on the 
anthropological concept of the “Trickster”. The trickster is a kind of character that rises 
in the times of uncertainty and disorientation such as the transitional phase that follows 
a revolution. Below is the definition of the trickster, according to Armbrust.  
“Trickster is at one and the same time creator and destroyer, giver and negator, he 
who dupes others and who is always duped himself. He wills nothing consciously. At 
all times he is constrained to behave as he does from impulses over which he has no 
control. He knows neither good nor evil yet he is responsible for both. He possesses 
no values, moral or social, is at the mercy of his passions and appetites, yet through 
his actions all values come into being” 
 
That definition makes it clear that Armbrust’s view of Okasha is of a negative 
nature that portrays Okasha as a symbol of the counter-revolution and postulates that 
the role he played and still playing is harmful to the Egyptian revolution and society at 
large. Armbrust believes that Okasha acted as the unacknowledged spokesman for the 
ruling Military Council that took over after the collapse of Mubarak’s regime. 
 Nevertheless, the study remains important as it traces the Okasha phenomenon 
from the beginning and provides important information about the political inclinations 
of Tawfik Okasha. Furthermore, this is the only academic study that gives an account 
of Al Abbasiya’s demonstrations that Okasha organized.  
Okasha showed his complete support for the ruling SCAF from the moment it 
took over after Mubarak stepped down. However it was not before November, 2011 
that his moral support was turned into a real and tangible support. The turning point 
was the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes that resulted into the death of more than 40 
protestors and forced Essam Sharaf, Egypt’s prime minister at that time to resign. Some 
of the protestors in Tahrir Square called for the resignation of SCAF as well. That was 
the moment that Okasha decided to call for his first protest to be held in Al-Abbasiya 
Square near the Ministry of Defense.  
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The protest witnessed the participation of thousands of people (Okasheyat, 
2011; Ibrahim, 2011). Ever since, Al Abassiya Square became the meeting point for 
Okasha’s supporters. And again in December, 2011, Okasha called for another protest 
to be held in Abbasiya to support SCAF after the cabinet clashes that took place in front 
of the Egyptian cabinet headquarters. Okasha called this event the “Friday of the 
crossing” in reference to the historical victory of the Egyptian Army in the October War 
of 1973 when the troops crossed to the other side of the canal and breached the Bar Lev 
line. The square was filled with banners that talked about the silent majority and its 
support for the Army, police and the Judiciary. An interesting and rather intimidating 
banner displayed four talk show hosts in nooses. They were Yousri Fouda, Reem 
Maged, Mona Al Shazli and Hala Sarhan (Ambrust, 2013). See Figure (1) 
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Figure (1) Banner from the Abbasiya protest in December 2011 
displaying four Egyptian talk show hosts in nooses 
Okasha is also known for his staunch criticism of the political Islam movements, 
especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Before Morsi was proclaimed winner of the 2012 
presidential elections, Okasha kept warning that if the Muslim Brotherhood assume 
power in Egypt, they will turn the country into a theocracy like Iran (Carr and Gohar, 
2013). His anti-Brotherhood discourse earned him the nickname of "Egypt's Glenn 
Beck", the famous American political commentator who is known for his conservative 
views. Glenn Beck himself made a radio commentary about Okasha praising his anti-
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Brotherhood opinions "He’s called the Egyptian Glenn Beck because he’s on Egyptian 
television and he’s been saying, ‘the Muslim Brotherhood, they’re Islamic extremists 
they are in bed with the leftists here,’ and ‘Egypt, stay away from these guys." (Beck, 
2012) 
In less than two months after Morsi assumed presidency, Al Faraeen was shut 
down as a result of a lawsuit filed against Okasha accusing him of "incitement to 
murder" President Morsi. (BBC, 2012) 
The channel remained closed for six months and Okasha was back on air in 
Macrh 2013. His criticism of the former President Mohamed Morsi and his policies 
continued and even escalated as Okasha called for another massive protest to demand 
the interference of the Army in order to end Morsi's rule. Again and on the 21st of June 
2013, thousands of people gathered near the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense in 
response to Okasha's call. 
 Less than 10 days later, Egypt witnessed the June 30th revolution that ousted 
President Morsi and put an end to the Muslim Brotherhood's rule. Soon afterwards the 
crew members of Okasha's show celebrated the success of the revolution and declared 
Okasha as the "godfather and leader of the revolution and the nation". The channel even 
aired a 22 minutes documentary titled "The Two Men" which showed that Egypt was 
saved from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Fourth-generation warfare through the 
efforts of two men: Field Marshal Abdel Fatah Al Sisi, and Tawfik Okasha who kept 
warning people against the "conspiracy of Jan 25th, 2011 and mobilized Egyptians 
against the Muslim Brotherhood and foreign interference". (xxMERCURICxx, 2013; 
ArbBom, 2013)  
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Okasha continued to adopt the same conspiratorial rhetoric even after the June 
30th revolution. He argued that there is a fifth-column in Egypt working against the 
stability and progress of the country and consider Tawfik Okasha as their main nemesis. 
Okasha vowed to continue exposing the fifth –column and that nothing they can do 
would make him afraid for that he did not fear the Muslim Brotherhood when they were 
in power. (Masat, 2013; RasdMasr, 2013) 
2.6 Tawfik Okasha in his own words 
*Due to the scarce literature on Tawfik Okasha, the researcher conducted a 
personal interview with him. The interview yielded rich information that deserves 
to be placed in a separate section. Additionally, integrating the perspective of 
Okasha himself is valuable to the purpose of this study. 
Tawfik Yehia Ibrahim Okasha, commonly known as Tawfik Okasha, was born 
on the 24th of January, 1967 in the city of Nabarouh in Dakahleya governorate. Okasha 
started his career as a television presenter in Channel 5 in Alexandria in 1991. He 
became the screenwriter and director of the famous show “Good Morning Egypt” in 
1993. According to Okasha, former President Hosni Mubarak liked the show and 
praised Okasha for a scope he made in 1994 after the floods that hit Upper Egypt. A 
presidential decree was issued and Okasha was moved to Channel 1 in Cairo in 1994. 
In 2000, he started hosting a new program on the Egyptian television named” Parties 
and Parliament” (Ahzab Wa Barlaman). It aired for five years. It covered all issues 
related to political parties and elections. However, the program was suspended the 
Minister of Information Anas Al Fiki in 2006. That was the time when Okasha first 
started to think about establishing a private television channel, especially that he has a 
Ph.D. in “Media Institution Management”. Right before that, Okasha had already 
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established a news website with that carries the same name of his future channel: 
AlFaraeen.com. It is worth noting that Okasha plans on re-launching the website soon.  
Regarding the ideological tendencies of the channel, Okasha said that it leans 
toward what he calls “Eastern liberalism”. This refers to the kind of freedom that does 
not contradict with the three monolithic religions. As for its political ideology, the 
channel adopted a “quasi-opposition” stance to the Mubarak regime.  According to 
Okasha, he believes his channel became popular because it catered to the interests of 
the Egyptian citizens living in other governorates beyond Greater Cairo. These 
governorates were ignored before by the majority of television channels. Moreover, he 
began watching and observing the norms of the “lower middle class” and peasants in 
order to know how to address them. Adopting that unique style led to raising the levels 
of political awareness among them. Okasha believes that political awareness, unless 
complemented by political participation, is useless. This is why he worked on raising 
people’s awareness and encouraging them to protest. He stressed that he is not just a 
talk show host. He is also a politician because he belongs to a family that has a long 
tradition in politics and that he himself was a member of the parliament once, therefore 
acting as a politician on his show is completely justified.  
 Okasha is certain that he played a major role in spreading proper “political 
education” among his viewers. Thanks to him, people became aware of what is meant 
by terms like Zionism and freemasons. His efforts made them acquire general 
knowledge about complicated issues that they knew nothing about before. So the lower 
middle class, which according to Okasha was ignored before by the media, started to 
esteem Okasha because he was the first television presenter to address them.  As for 
the youth of the revolution that he has always attacked on his show, Okasha argues that 
they do not represent all the Egyptian youth who were always present in his protests.  
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Regarding his use of anti-revolutionary discourse, Tawfik Okasha argued that 
he did not think that the January revolution was a conspiracy from the beginning. On 
the contrary, he showed support for it. However, by mid-March, 2011, he soon realized 
that what was happened cannot be labeled as a revolution and that it was a conspiracy 
against Egypt. That was the time when Al Faraeen channel’s policy changed as it started 
to focus on exposing the conspiracy led by Hamas, Hezbollah, Turkey and Qatar. The 
channel was the first to bring to the attention of the public the role of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in breaking into prisons and burning down police stations across the 
country during the January 25th revolution. 
 That led to a significant increase in the viewership of the channel that made it 
the “top channel” in Egypt and the Arab World that is watched by more than 40 million 
people daily. When asked about the source of such information, Okasha said that he 
has a “friend” working in the Nile Sat who provided him with the channel’s ratings.  
As for his sources of information, Okasha denied any affiliation to any of the 
security institutions. He said that he gathers his information from reading and from his 
network of friends in Europe. This enabled him to make accurate predictions most of 
the time. 
Okasha believes that the conspiracy that Egypt was facing forced him to adopt 
the theory of “crisis communication”. Crisis communication refers to the use of 
nationalist discourse by media professionals in order to warn people against the dangers 
facing the country and the looming civil war. He also believes that abiding to the 
professional journalistic rules under these circumstances have proven to be a complete 
failure. Organizing protests was part of the crisis communication strategy implemented 
by Okasha. He argues that the first protest he called for in Abassiya Square was attended 
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by about half a million protestor. This was the first successful protest organized by 
Okasha, and was followed by many others. Okasha believes that the biggest protest was 
the one held near the Nasr City podium the night of declaring the winner of the 2012 
presidential elections. It was attended by 2 million people. Nevertheless, Okasha admits 
he was wrong when he told people to leave before announcing the official results. He 
believes that had the protesters stayed, Ahmed Shafik would have been declared the 
winner instead of Mohamed Morsi.  
As for the pre-June 30th protests, Okasha said that between March 2013 and 
June of the same year, he organized 13 protests in 13 different governorates. These 
protests mainly aimed at supporting the state institutions, especially the Armed forces, 
the police, the Judiciary, Al Azhar and the Coptic Church. Okasha contends that these 
protests provided people with the required field training to protest in massive numbers 
and overthrow Morsi and the Brotherhood.  
Okasha also says that he helped the grassroots movement of “Tamarrod” in 
getting from 8-12 million signatures on their petition to end Morsi’s presidential term 
and hold new presidential elections. Okasha firmly believes that he is the leader of the 
June 30th revolution. He believes that if it has not been for his efforts and the protests 
he organized all over Egypt, people would not have protested with the massive numbers 
that everybody saw on June 30th.  
Okasha says that he is not going to organize any protests in the future. Instead, 
he would call on people to voice out their concerns and problems through their 
parliamentary representatives. Also he plans on launching a campaign that urges people 
to vote for centrist parties that do not adhere to the ideology of political Islam.  
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In a nutshell, Tawfik Okasha is a controversial talk show host who refuses to 
abide to the traditional values of objective television journalism and instead perceives 
himself as a “man with a message” for Egyptians. He also believes that he is the leader 
of the June 30th revolution.  But do Egyptians perceive him as so? This is what this 
current study aims at exploring through the use of source credibility theory.  
Theoretical Framework 
2.7 Source Credibility Theory 
Source credibility is a theory among several other persuasion theories that 
explains why certain people have the ability to increase the message effectiveness and 
change people's attitudes. It is used to evaluate the effect that the communicator's 
personality has on his message. Other important factors that should be taken into 
account include the structure of the message, traits of the receiver, and the context of 
the message itself (O'Keefe, 2002) 
 The concept of source credibility and its importance in adding effectiveness to 
the message, is as old as time. Aristotle was perhaps the first one to pinpoint that the 
communicator's "ethos" played an essential role in influencing the audience. Ethos 
refers to the communicator's knowledge and expertise about the topic. A highly gifted 
speaker in ancient Athens had the ability to influence the jurors who would reach a 
decision based on how convincing the speaker s, regardless of facts and evidence 
(Warnick, 2004; Umeogu, 2012). The impact of source credibility on the message is 
crucial as a source low in credibility can cause the audience to disregard the persuasive 
elements of the message (Greenberg & Miller, 1965) 
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 Therefore a great deal of the message effectiveness has to do with the honesty 
and trustworthiness of the one relaying it. For that reason, persuasion is entirely 
different from propaganda. Unlike propagandists who remain unidentified, persuaders 
reveal their real intent and are perceived to be sincerely concerned about the welfare of 
their audience (Jowett &O'Donnell, 1999). According to Brinol and Petty (2009), a 
source that is high in credibility has the ability to make people support and believe the 
content of his message, unlike a source low in credibility that would result in increasing 
the probability of producing unfavorable thoughts regarding his message. In other 
words, the credibility of the source does have an effect on creating either a positive or 
negative attitude toward the message.  
Here it becomes important to highlight the fact that there is a dynamic and rather 
interactive relationship between the communicator's credibility and his message. While 
the credibility of the communicator enhances the persuasive effects of his message, it 
is also true that the content of his message impacts his credibility. Roberts (2010) points 
out that a common error made by credibility scholars is that they for the most part 
sought to study separately either the message or the messenger, overlooking the 
complicated interrelationships between the two.  
In the light of this, the first hypothesis of this study examines the effect of the message 
type on the credibility of the source. It seeks to see if the nationalistic elements in 
Tawfik Okasha's discourse increase his credibility as a communicator. 
H1: People who like nationalist discourse tend to perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible  
Historically, Hovland and Weiss's (1951) study was the first study conducted to 
examine the effect of highly credible communicators on the effectiveness of the 
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message. Their experiment showed that messages endorsed by highly credible 
communicators resulted into real opinion change. 
In order to decipher the main components of credibility itself, Hovland took the 
theory further and in 1953 he wrote his book "Communication and Persuasion" in 
which he identified the two main dimensions of credibility as being expertise and 
trustworthiness. Moreover, he discussed another important feature that makes a 
communicator credible in the eyes of the audience; that is being perceived as 
"belonging to a group with which the recipient is also affiliated with." (Hovland &Janis, 
1959, p.11). 
 In recent years, Rhoads and Caildini (2002) defined expertise as the knowledge 
and experience that the communicator seems to have about the issue or topic at hand, 
while trustworthiness refers to "the communicator's honesty and lack of bias". 
Interestingly, Lui and Standing (1986) argued that trustworthiness is a much stronger 
component of credibility than expertness. The study tested the effect of a persuasive 
message regarding AIDS directed at nuns. The message was presented first by a priest 
and then a doctor. The results showed that the priest was more persuasive than the 
doctor as he was perceived to be highly trustworthy by the nuns.  
A third dimension that is often overlooked by researchers despite its importance 
is "goodwill". Goodwill has three aspects: understanding, empathy, and responsiveness. 
Understanding entails having knowledge about the feelings and needs of others, while 
empathy means the acceptance of the views of others even if one does not fully agree 
with them and responsiveness refers to how attentive the person seems to be to the 
message of another person (McCroskey & Teven, 1999). 
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By applying all three dimensions of credibility, Teven (2008) studied the 
credibility of the presidential candidates in the American presidential elections in 2008. 
His results showed that Barack Obama got “the highest means for perceived credibility” 
leading to increasing his likeability and believability. So the first research question that 
this study will try to answer is: 
RQ1: Is Tawfik Okasha a credible communicator? 
 Many domains discussed the role played by the communicators' credibility in 
changing the attitudes of the indented audience. Highly credible sources such as 
celebrities are used by advertisers to enhance the image of their product. The more the 
audience identifies with the celebrity, the more successful the advertisement is expected 
to be (Jain & Posavac, 2001; Spry et al., 2009; Roy et al., 2013). 
 Also studies in the field of experimental psychology asserted that the people 
with high credibility play an important role in perceiving the message to be truthful. 
Credible sources influence the way the message is comprehended by the audience 
(Henkel & Mattson, 2011; Sparks & Rapp, 2011). In a different context, Infante (1985) 
also tackled the concept of credibility as he sought to discover the effect of women’s 
argumentativeness on their credibility. The results showed that the more argumentative 
a woman is, the higher her perceived credibility will be.  
Given that all these studies focused on the role of source credibility in creating 
a positive attitude toward a product or a person, the third hypothesis of this study 
postulates that: 
H2a: People who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are more likely to believe that 
political participation is important  
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 However, the behavioral component of political participation was not covered. 
Therefore, the third and fourth hypotheses in this study aim at measuring the impact of 
Tawfik Okasha's credibility on the political behavior of his audience. It seeks to see if 
there is a relationship between watching Okasha's show and active political 
participation (i.e. attending a protest, voting for a certain candidate, working in the 
campaign of a political candidate).  
H2b: People who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are more likely to vote for the 
candidates he supports  
H3: People who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are more likely to have 
participated in a protest he organized  
The level of education is an important variable in the process of persuasibility. 
Previous studies have shown that highly educated people are harder to persuade, people 
with a low level of education are assumed to be easier to persuade (O'Keefe, 2002; Bay, 
2002). Furthermore, education is considered a marker when it comes to political 
awareness and participation. According to Martinussen (1971), the inequality in 
education between different segments of the society lead to remarkable differences in 
political participation. However, this might not always be the case. In their study about 
the effect of education on political persuasion during the times of crisis, Johansen and 
Joslyn (2008) found out that the difference in education does not always affect the level 
of persuasiveness. In some cases it might be a “resisting agent” against political 
propaganda but at other times not. Yanagizawa- Drott (2011) conducted a study about 
the relationship between propaganda, persuasion and education.  The study focused on 
the case study of “Hate Radio” in Rwanda. The “Hate Radio” refers to the Radio 
Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) that was founded in the wake of the 
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Rwandian genocide by the Hutu. It called for the extermination of all those who 
belonged to the Tutsi ethnic group. The study found that the (RTLM) did not have a 
substantial effect of high villages with high literacy rates. In contrast, it was most 
effective in villages that lacked basic education. Hence it is quite logical to assume that 
education is an important variable in the process of perception. If this is applied to the 
current study, the fourth hypothesis that the current study aims at investigating should 
relate to the relationship between the level of education that a person has and his 
perception of Tawfik Okasha's credibility. So the fourth hypothesis assumes that: 
H4: Compared to the rest of the educational levels, highly educated people are 
less likely to perceive Tawfik Okasha to be a credible communicator 
Finally and as noted in the literature review, there is a correlation between 
Internet use and political participation, especially for the youth.  If this is combined 
with Tawfik Okasha’s anti-revolutionary discourse and attack of young political 
activists, the fifth hypothesis states that: 
H5: Young people who use the Internet as a primary source for political information 
do not perceive Tawfik Okasha to be a credible communicator 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This study used a survey to assess the impact of the credibility of Egyptian talk 
show host Tawfik Okasha on the political participation of his viewers. The reason this 
method was selected had to do with the fact that surveys render large amounts of data 
in a relatively short time. Moreover, it provides the researcher with the opportunity to 
test many variables and assess their relationships to each other (Wimmer & Dominick, 
2006, p.180) 
In addition, the researcher conducted a semi-structured interview with Tawfik 
Okasha at the headquarters of Al Faraeen channel. According to Qu and Dumay (2011), 
“the semi-structured interview enjoys its popularity because it is flexible, accessible 
and intelligible and, more important, capable of disclosing important and often hidden 
facets of human and organizational behavior”. Building on this, the researcher 
constructed a set of questions that corresponded to the main themes of the study. The 
main objective of this interview was to identify how Tawfik Okasha sees himself and 
the effect he has on his viewers’ political participation. Furthermore, the information 
derived from this interview was compared with the quantitative data obtained from the 
survey. This was done so as to provide a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of 
Tawfik Okasha. 
3.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
RQ1: Is Tawfik Okasha a credible communicator?  
 This question addresses a core component of this research as seeks to measure 
Tawfik Okasha’s credibility through a 5-point Likert scale that consisted of 11 
items. (1) meant Strongly Agree, (2) meant Agree, (3) meant Neutral, (4) meant 
Disagree, while (5) meant Strongly Disagree.  
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 The following four statements were used to measure the first component of 
credibility: expertness. 
 Tawfik Okasha is a reliable source for information.  
 Tawfik Okasha is knowledgeable about politics. 
 Tawfik Okasha has the ability to make accurate predictions about the future. 
 I think Okasha is highly intelligent. 
 Trustworthiness, the second component of source credibility was measured by 
the following four statements: 
  I believe that Okasha is honest in his presentation of facts.  
 I think that Okasha is an honorable patriot. 
 I think that Okasha is genuinely concerned about the welfare of the Egyptian 
nation.  
 I think that Okasha is politically independent. 
 The third and final component of source credibility, goodwill, was measured by 
the following three statements: 
 I identify with Tawfik Okasha on many levels. 
 I feel that Tawfik Okasha is concerned about my well-being.  
 I think that Okasha understands my needs and respects my values. 
H1: People who like nationalist discourse tend to perceive Tawfik Okasha as 
credible. 
 This hypothesis aims at examining if there is correlation between liking 
nationalist discourse and the tendency to perceive Tawfik Okasha to be a 
credible communicator. 
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In the light of the definition provided by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
for the concept of “nationalism”, the independent variable of “nationalist discourse” 
was operationally defined by the researcher as “discourse that entails the use of 
expressions and ideas which reflect the caring attitude of the nation members about the 
sovereignty of their country” (Nenad, 2010) 
It was measured by five statements:  
 I believe that what happened on the 25th of January, 2011 was a real 
revolution. 
 I believe that what happened on the 30th of June, 2013 was a real revolution. 
 I believe that Egypt has many enemies who are still conspiring against its 
stability. 
 I believe in the existence of a fifth-column in Egypt.  
 I am ready to fight and die for my country's sake. 
The dependent variable of “perceiving Okasha as credible” was measured by the 
aforementioned Likert scale statements.  
 
  
H2a: People who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are more likely to believe 
that political participation is important. 
This hypothesis predicts that the more someone perceives Tawfik Okasha to be a 
credible communicator, the more likely he/she will believe that political participation 
is important. 
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The independent variable of “political participation” is measured by question no. 6. 
Political participation was operationally defined as “voting in the elections and 
attending a protest” 
Q6. Do you think that political participation is important for Egypt's future? 
1. Yes, it is important 
2. No, it is not important 
H2b: People who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are more likely to vote for 
the candidates he supports. 
 This hypothesis predicts that people who think that Tawfik Okasha is credible 
will vote for the candidates he supports. This is measured by question no.8 which 
asks about who the respondent voted for in the 2012 presidential elections and 
question no. 15 which asks about the candidate that the respondents are going to 
vote for in the upcoming presidential elections. 
H3: People who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are more likely to have 
participated in a protest he organized. 
 This hypothesis predicts that people who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are 
expected to have participated in a protest he called for. This hypothesis is 
measured by statement no.18 on the Likert scale, where respondents were given 
the option to estimate how they felt about participating in one of the Okasha’s 
protests. Statement 17 reads “I am proud to have participated in protests 
organized by Tawfik Okasha” 
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 H4: Compared to the rest of the educational levels, highly educated people 
are less likely to perceive Tawfik Okasha to be a credible communicator 
 This hypothesis predicts that highly educated people are less likely to perceive 
Tawfik Okasha to be a credible communicator. The independent variable of 
education was measured by a question in the demographics section which 
contained different educational levels. The choices were Illiterate ,Reads and 
writes, Less than high school (primary or elementary school), High school ,
Technical diploma, Bachelor’s degree.  Highly educated people refers to 
holders of a Bachelor’s degree. 
H5: Young people who use the Internet as a primary source for political 
information do not perceive Tawfik Okasha to be a credible communicator. 
 This hypothesis predicts that the youth who rely on the Internet to provide them 
with political information are expected not to think that Tawfik Okasha is a 
credible communicator. This independent variables of “Young people” and 
“Internet use” are measured by questions no. 1 and 18. Question 1 asks about 
the primary source that the respondent relies on for political information. Five 
choices were listed. They were: Newspapers, Television, Internet, Radio, 
Family and friends. Also the option of “other” was added. As for the “young 
people” variable, question no.18 in the demographics section specified 5 age 
ranges. The first was 18-21 years old, the second 22-35 years old, the third 36-
50 years old, the fourth 51-60 years old and the fifth one was “older than 60 
years”. The researcher operationally defined the youth as people whose age 
range between 18-35 years old. 
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3.2 Type of Sample 
The sample used to conduct this survey was a non-probability “Quota sample” 
whereby the respondents were chosen according to a predetermined variable 
(Rajamanickam, 2001, p.81). The variable chosen by the researcher was 
education. It is important to highlight that the quota allocated for each category 
does not correspond to the real proportion of the different educational 
attainments among the Egyptian population. This is mainly because there are 
no official figures available in this regard. Therefore it is a disproportionate 
quota sample.  The respondents were classified into four main categories: the 
first category included the illiterate, the second one combined people who could 
read and write and those who have only completed their education till the 
primary or elementary stage. The third one included people who have completed 
their high school education or technical diploma. The fourth and last category 
included people who have a bachelor’s degree. Fifty participants were allocated 
for each of the four categories.  
3.3 Sample Size 
Due to cost and time considerations, the sample size that the researcher opted 
for was 200 participants. Another reason was because the results are not going 
to be generalizable since the sample used is a non-probability sample. Therefore 
this study lacks external validity. 
3.4 Data collection 
 Due to difficulty in reaching the targeted sample as most of it was concentrated 
in poor neighborhoods that the researcher had difficulty in accessing, a trained 
interviewer was hired to administer the surveys. This trained interviewer chosen 
was a graduate student at the Faculty of Mass Communication, Cairo 
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University. The training entailed the ethical rules and considerations when 
approaching the participants. It also included training the interviewer on making 
sure that no question that required an answer was skipped.  More importantly, 
the interviewer was given instructions about the required quota to be met for 
each category. The interviewer first would ask about the educational levels of 
the respondents, then they were asked if they watched Okasha’s daily talk show 
or not. Surveys were conducted in Greater Cairo and Giza. The interviewer went 
to places of social gatherings like cafes and asked the possible respondents if 
they were interested to fill out the survey. It is worth noting that the majority of 
the sample consisted of males. This has to do with the conservative cultural 
norms of the Egyptian society which makes it difficult to approach females on 
the street. That explains the disproportion of gender distribution found in the 
sample. 
3.5 Pretesting 
Pretesting is a critical step that should be carried out before conducting the 
survey as it increases the quality of the data the survey is expected to generate 
(DeMaio, Rothgeb, & Hess, 1998). A pretest was conducted by the researcher 
to make sure that all the questions were easy to understand. Thirty respondents 
were asked to answer the survey and report any difficulty or unclear 
expressions. The remarks the respondents had were taken into consideration by 
the researcher who modified some questions and added more choices to others. 
In question 13 which asked about whom the participants responded to their call 
to protest on the 30th of June, many respondents wrote “Tamarrod” beside the 
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option “An independent revolutionary group”. Accordingly the option of the 
“independent revolutionary group” was replaced with “Tamarrod”.  
The researcher interviewed the respondents after they finished the pretest and 
noticed that they had several comments about Tawfik Okasha. That is why the 
researcher thought it was necessary to have an open-ended question to check if 
the respondents had something to add. Therefore question 16 was placed at the 
end of the survey. In general, the respondents who took the pretest said that the 
questions were concise and easy to understand. 
3.6 Survey Design 
Due to the nature of the current study and the different educational levels 
involved, the survey was translated into Arabic. The survey was divided into 
four parts. The first part was designed to see measure the type and frequency of 
media use by the respondents. This part consisted of 4 questions. The first 
question asked about the main source for political information. The second one 
asked about the number of hours that the respondent spends in watching 
television. The third one asked about the number of hours that the respondent 
spends in watching Talk Shows. The fourth one asked about the frequency by 
which the respondent watched Tawfik Okasha’s program (Masr Al Yom) on Al 
Faraeen channel. 
 It is worth noting that this question was designed to make sure that all those 
who took the survey watched Okasha’s talk show. Even though the trained 
interviewer was instructed to ask the respondents about this before giving them 
the survey, the researcher added a disqualifying choice. It read” I do not know 
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who Tawfik Okasha is”. In this case, the respondent would be thanked for their 
time and asked to terminate the survey. 
The second part aimed at measuring three elements: the first was Tawfik 
Okasha’s credibility, the second was what the respondents thought about the 
nationalist discourse that he used and the third was designed to measure the 
direct effect of Tawfik Okasha on the political behavior of his viewers. All three 
elements were measured on a 5-point Likert scale. 
The third part aimed at measuring the political participation levels of 
respondents starting from the January 25th revolution until the constitutional 
referendum that was carried out this year. This part also covered the tendency 
of the respondents to participate in the upcoming presidential elections.  
The fourth part was the demographics section that included the personal 
information of the respondents. It consisted of 5 questions that asked about 
gender, age, level of education, employment status and monthly income. 
All survey questions were closed-ended, except for one question that the 
researcher though would yield more useful information about the credibility of 
Tawfik Okasha. Question (16) was placed in the end of the third section. It asked 
the respondents if they had anything that they would like to add about TV talk 
show host Tawfik Okasha. 54% of the respondents answered this question and 
that is why the researcher carefully analyzed the answers to detect common 
themes among them. As a result, the answers fell into 5 main categories which 
were coded and inserted into SPSS.     
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    Chapter 4: Results  
The data were coded by the researcher and entered into the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences software (SPSS) which generated the following results. 
Descriptive Data Analysis 
4.1 Sample characteristics 
1. Gender 
The overwhelming majority of the sample consisted of males, whereby (n=194) 
representing 97% of the sample. Only 3% were females (n=6). 
2. Age 
84.5% of the sample were between the ages of 22- 50 years old. The distribution of 
respondents’ ages is documented in Figure (2) 
 
 
Figure (2) 
 
 
18-21 years old; 
6.50%
22-35 years old; 
46.50%
36-51 years 
old; 38%
51-60 years old; 
8.50%
Older than 60 years; 
0.50%
Age of Respondents
18-21 years old 22-35 years old 36-51 years old 51-60 years old Older than 60 years
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3. Education 
As stated before, the quota sampling technique that the researcher used specified a 
certain quota for each educational level. 25% of the sample was allocated to the 
Illiterate, another 25% for respondents who could read and write and have completed 
their education up to the primary or elementary stage. Then 25% for respondents who 
completed their education till High school and the last 25% was allocated for BA 
holders. 
4. Employment status 
As it appears in Figure (3), 62% of the sample falls under the “Employed” category, 
while 5.5% appear to be unemployed and 22.5% reported that they are “Freelancers”. 
 
Figure (3) 
5. Monthly Income 
47.8% of the respondents’ reported that their monthly income ranges between 1000-
2000 L.E, while the monthly income for 41.8% of the sample ranged between 500-
1000 L.E. Figure (4) shows the distribution of respondents’ monthly income. It is 
Employed; 62%Unemployed; 5.50%
Freelance; 22.50%
Employment Status of Respondents
Employed Unemployed Freelance
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worth noting that the 5th choice “More than 3000 L.E” was not chosen by any of the 
respondents in the sample  
 
     Figure (4) 
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Distribution of Repondents' Monthly 
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4.2 Type and frequency of Media Use 
A. More than half of the sample use television as their primary source for political 
information (52.5%), while Newspapers and the Internet were selected as the 
primary source for political information by 23.5% of the sample for each. The 
radio was selected by only one respondent (0.5 %). See Figure (5) 
 
Figure (5) Primary Source for Political Information 
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B. 46% of the respondents reported that they watch Television daily for more than 
2 hours -3 hours.  27.5% of the respondents said that they watch Television for 
more than an hour-2 hours daily. See Figure (6) 
 
Figure (6) How many hours do you spend watching Television daily? 
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C. About half of the sample (49.5%) said that they spend more than an hour to two 
hours watching talk shows daily. 34.5% reported that they watch talk shows for 
less than an hour daily. See Figure (7) 
 
Figure (7) How many hours do you spend watching T.V. talk shows daily? 
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D. For 63% of the sample, the frequency of watching Tawfik Okasha’s talk show 
“Masr Al Yom” ranges between “once a week” and “daily”. See Figure (8) 
 
Figure (8) Frequency of watching Tawfik Okasha’s talk show “Masr Al Yom” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37%
11.5%
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4.3 Analysis of respondents’ political participation levels 
The analysis showed that 92% of the sample believed that political participation is 
important for Egypt’s future (See Table 1) 
 
Q6: Do you think that political participation is important for Egypt's future? 
 
Frequency Percent   
 Yes 184 92.0   
No 16 8.0   
Total 200 100.0   
Table (1) 
 
Regarding their participation in the 2012 presidential elections, 89.5% of the 
respondents (n=179) reported that they voted in the elections, while 10.5% (n=21) said 
that they did not vote. (See Table 2) 
 
Q7: Did you vote in the 2012 presidential elections? 
 Frequency Percent   
 Yes 179 89.5   
No 21 10.5   
Total 200 100.0   
Table (2) 
 
When asked about which candidate they voted for, 81% (n=145) said that they voted 
for Ahmed Shafik, while 14% (n=25) said that they voted for Mohamed Morsi and only 
5% (n=9) reported that they annulled their votes. (See Table 3) 
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Q8: Who did you vote for in the 2012 presidential elections? 
 
 Frequency Percent   
 Mohamed 
Morsi 
25 14   
Ahmed 
Shafik 
145 81   
I annulled 
my vote 
9 5   
Total 179 100   
      
     
 
Table (3) 
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As for the most recent act of political participation, that is the 2014 constitutional 
referendum, 88.5% (n=177) said that they did participate in the referendum, while 
11.5% (n=23) said that they did not participate. Of those who participated, 89.3% 
voted in favor of the constitution “Yes” and 9.7% voted against it “No” (See Tables 4 
and 5) 
 
 
 
Table (4) 
 
Q10: Did you vote in favor of the constitution or against it? 
 Frequency Percent   
 Yes 158 89.3   
No 19 10.7   
Total  177 100.0   
      
     
Table (5) 
 
 
 
 
Q9: Did you participate in the January 2014 constitutional referendum? 
 Frequency Percent   
 Yes 177 88.5   
No 23 11.5   
Total 200 100.0   
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The analysis of the results also showed that the June 30th revolution witnessed the 
participation of 76% of the respondents (n=152), compared to 48.5% (n=97) for the 
January 25th revolution (See Table 6 and 7) 
 Interestingly, 41.4% of those who participated in the January 25th revolution 
participated in the June 30th revolution, while 58.6% of those who did not participate 
in the January revolution reported participating in the June revolution (See Table 24) 
 
Q11: Did you participate in the protests of the January 25th revolution? 
 
Frequency Percent   
 Yes 97 48.5   
No 103 51.5   
Total  200 100.0   
     Table (6) 
 
Q12: Did you participate in the protests of the June 30th revolution? 
 
Frequency Percent   
 Yes 152 76.0   
No 48 24.0   
Total 200 100.0   
    Table (7) 
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Table (8) Participation in the January revolution Vs. Participation in the June 
revolution 
When asked about whom they responded to their call to protest on June 30th, 2013, 
Tawfik Okasha and the revolutionary movement “Tamarrod” were chosen by 61.8% 
(n=94) and 58.6% (n=89) of the respondents respectively (Note that question allowed 
respondents to choose 2 options). Only 4.7 %( n=7) chose “Political Party”.  
(See Tables 9, 10 and 11) 
 
 
 
Did you participate in the 
protests of the June 30th 
revolution? 
Total Yes No 
Did you 
participate in 
the protests of 
the January 
25th 
revolution?  
Yes Count 63 34 97 
% within  
Participants in 
the June 30th 
revolution 
41.4% 70.8% 48.5% 
No Count 89 14 103 
% within  
Participants in 
the June 30th 
revolution 
58.6% 29.2% 51.5% 
Total Count 152 48 200 
% within  
Participants in 
the June 30th 
revolution 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table (9) Responding to the call of Tawfik Okasha to protest on June 30th 
 
 
Table (10) Responding to the call of Tamarrod to protest on June 30th 
 
 
Table (11) Responding to the call of a political party to protest on June 30th 
 
 
 
Q13:Tawfik Okasha 
Total Yes No 
Did you 
participate in the 
protests of the 
June 30th 
revolution? 
Yes Count 94 58 152 
% within 
Participants in the 
June 30th revolution 
61.8% 38.2% 100.0% 
    
   Total                                          94 58 152  
61.8% 38.2% 100.0%  
    
 
 
Q13:Tamarrod 
Total Yes No 
Did you 
participate in the 
protests of the 
June 30th 
revolution? 
Yes Count 89 63 152 
% within 
Participants in the 
June 30th revolution 
58.6% 41.4% 100.0% 
    
 Total 89 63 152 
 58.6% 41.4% 100.0% 
    
 
 
Q13: Political Party 
Total Yes No 
Did you 
participate in the 
protests of the 
June 30th 
revolution? 
Yes Count 7 145 152 
% within 
Participants in the 
June 30th 
revolution 
4.6% 95.4% 100.0% 
 Total 7 145 152 
 4.6% 95.4% 100.0% 
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 Moreover, the Likert statements that measure the relationship between Tawfik 
Okasha and the political participation tendencies of his viewers showed that the 
mean score for Statement (18):” I voted for a particular candidate because 
Okasha endorsed him” is 2.6 which is closer to the “Agree” category. 
  The mean score for Statement (19):” I intend to work in the political campaign 
of Abdel Fatah Al Sisi because Okasha supports him” is 2.00 which means that 
the respondents seem to be willing to work in the presidential campaign of 
Abdel Fatah Al Sisi because Okasha supports him. (See Table 12) 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
I voted for a 
particular candidate 
because Okasha 
endorsed him  
 
200 1 5 2.60 1.248 
I intend to work in 
the presidential 
campaign of Abdel 
Fatah Al Sisi because 
Okasha supports 
him  
200 1 5 2.00 1.190 
      
Table (12) 
 As for the future political participation of the respondents, 87.5% (n=175) said 
that they were going to vote in the upcoming presidential elections. 10 % (n=21) 
said that they have not made up their minds yet, while 2% (n=4) said that they 
are not going to vote. (See Table 28). 88.6% (n=155) of the respondents who 
are going to participate said that they will vote for the presidential candidate 
Abdel Fatah Al Sisi, while 11.4% (n=20) said that they plan on voting for the 
other presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahy. (See Tables 13 and 14) 
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Q14: Are you going to participate in the upcoming presidential elections? 
 
Frequency Percent   
 Yes 175 87.5   
No 4 2   
Still not sure 21 10   
Total 200 100.0   
     Table (13) 
Table (14) 
 
 
 The last question which was an open-ended question was answered by 54% of 
the respondents (n=108). The comments were coded into 5 main categories. 
34.3% of the respondents who answered this question belived that “Okasha is 
an honest and courageous man who fights corruption”, 26.9% said that they 
“trust his opinions and believe that he is Egypt’s best talk show host. On the 
other hand, 18.5 % said that they believed Okasha to be “a corrupt and 
hypocritical talk show host. 16.7 % reported that they do not like him because 
Q15: If you are going to participate, who are you going to vote for? 
 
Frequency Percent   
 Hamdeen 
Sabahy 
20 11.4   
Abdel 
Fatah Al 
Sisi 
155 88.6   
Total 175 100.0   
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“he is not a professional communicator”. Finally, 3.7% believed that “Tawfik 
Okasha manipulates poor people and takes advantage of their ignorance”. 
 
Q16: Do you have anything else that you would like to say about T.V talk show host Tawfik Okasha? 
 Frequency Percent   
 Tawfik Okasha 
is an honest and 
courageous man 
who fights 
corruption 
37 34.3   
I trust Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
opinions and 
believe that he is 
Egypt’s best talk 
show host 
29 26.9   
Tawfik Okasha 
is a corrupt and 
hypocritical talk 
show host 
20 18.5   
I do not like 
Tawfik Okasha 
because he is not 
a professional 
communicator  
18 16.7   
Tawfik Okasha 
manipulates poor 
people and takes 
advantage of 
their ignorance  
4 3.7   
Total                   108             100.0   
      
     
Table (15) 
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4.4 Answering the Research Questions and Testing the Hypotheses of the Study 
A. (RQ1): Is Tawfik Okasha a credible communicator?  
This question aimed at measuring Tawfik Okasha’s credibility based on three main 
components: Expertness, trustworthiness and goodwill. 
1st: Expertness 
The results showed that Tawfik Okasha was highly rated on the expertness component 
(See Table 16) 
 The mean score for the expertness component of Tawfik Okaasha’s credibility is 2.22 
(See Table 17) 
Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Total 
1.Tawfik Okasha is 
a reliable source for 
information 
30 
(15%) 
104 
(52%) 
26 
(13%) 
26 
(13%) 
14 
(7%) 
200 
(100%) 
2. Tawfik Okasha is 
knowledgeable 
about politics 
40 
(20%) 
109 
(54.5%) 
19 
(9.5%) 
17 
(8.5%) 
15 
(7.5%) 
200 
(100%) 
3. Tawfik Okasha 
has the ability to 
make accurate 
predictions about 
the future 
44 
(22%) 
85 
(42.5%) 
34 
(17%) 
24 
(12%) 
13 
(6.5%) 
200 
(100%) 
4. I think Tawfik 
Okasha is highly 
intelligent 
49 
(24.5%) 
102 
(51%) 
20 
(10%) 
14 
(7%) 
15 
(7.5%) 
200 
(100%) 
Table (16) Distribution of respondents’ rating of Tawfik Okasha’s expertness 
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Table (17) The mean score of Tawfik Okasha’s expertness  
 
 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Expertness 200 1.00 5.00 2.2200 1.16118 
      
 
2nd: Trustworthiness 
The results showed that Tawfik Okasha was highly rated on the trustworthiness 
component (See Table 18) 
The mean score for the trustworthiness component of Tawfik Okaasha’s credibility is 
2.36 (Table 19) 
Table (18) Distribution of respondents’ rating of Tawfik Okasha’s 
Trustworthiness 
Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Total 
5. I believe that 
Tawfik Okasha is 
honest in his 
presentation of facts 
44 
(22%) 
88 
(44%) 
28 
(14%) 
27 
(13.5%) 
13 
(6.5%) 
200 
(100%) 
6. I think that Tawfik 
Okasha is an 
honorable patriot 
39 
(19.5%) 
98 
(49%) 
24 
(12%) 
22 
(11%) 
17 
(8.5%) 
200 
(100%) 
7. I think that Tawfik 
Okasha is genuinely 
concerned about the 
welfare of the 
Egyptian nation 
42 
(21%) 
83 
(41.5%) 
31 
(15.5%) 
24 
(12%) 
20 
(10%) 
200 
(100%) 
8. I think that Tawfik 
Okasha is politically 
independent 
23 
(11.5%) 
111 
(55.5%) 
37 
(18.5%) 
17 
(8.5%) 
12 
(6%) 
200 
(100%) 
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Table (19) The mean score of Tawfik Okasha’s trustworthiness 
  
 
3rd: Goodwill  
The results showed that Tawfik Okasha was moderately rated on the goodwill 
component (Table 20) 
The mean score for the goodwill component of Tawfik Okaasha’s credibility is 2.77 
(Table 21) 
Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Total 
9. I identify with 
Tawfik Okasha on 
many levels 
17 
(8.5%) 
87 
(43.5%) 
26 
(13%) 
34 
(17%) 
36 
(18%) 
200 
(100%) 
10. I feel that 
Tawfik Okasha is 
concerned about 
my well-being 
18 
(9%) 
98 
(49%) 
26 
(13%) 
32 
(16%) 
26 
(13%) 
200 
(100%) 
11. I think that  
Tawfik Okasha 
understands my 
needs and respects 
my values   
20 
(10%) 
110 
(55%) 
25 
(12.5%) 
28 
(14%) 
17 
(8.5%) 
200 
(100%) 
Table (20) Distribution of respondents’ rating of Tawfik Okasha’s Goodwill 
 
 
 
      
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Trustworthiness 200 1.00 5.00 2.3600 1.21977 
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Table (21) The mean score of Tawfik Okasha’s Goodwill  
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Goodwill 200 1.00 5.00 2.7750 1.23369 
      
 
 The three components were combined together to assess the overall credibility 
of Tawfik Okasha. The mean score for Tawfik Okasha’s credibility is 2.42 
(Table 22) 
 This shows that Tawfik Okasha is a credible communicator. Hence the first 
question of this study is answered.   
Table (22) The mean score of Tawfik Okasha’s overall Credibility 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Overall Credibility 200 1.00 5.00 2.4250 1.14934 
      
 
      
H1: People who like nationalist discourse tend to perceive Tawfik Okasha as 
credible. 
The testing of this hypothesis entailed comparing the choices made by the respondents 
on both variables: liking nationalist discourse and perceiving Tawfik Okasha as 
credible (See Table 8) 
The use of Chi-Square test showed that there is a positive relationship between both 
variables (p <0.001). Therefore Hypothesis H1 was supported. 
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The results showed that 27.5 % of the people who strongly liked (Strongly Agree) 
nationalist discourse also strongly believed that Tawfik Okasha is a credible 
communicator, while 47.1% of the people who liked (Agree) nationalist discourse also 
perceived Okahsa to be a credible communicator. On the other hand, 13.8% of the 
people who were neutral about the use of nationalist discourse were also neutral about 
Okasha’s credibility. 8.7 % of the respondents who disliked nationalist discourse also 
did not perceive Okasha to be credible. Finally, 2.9% of the respondents who strongly 
disliked nationalist discourse reported that they did not believe that Okasha is a credible 
communicator. 
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Nationalist Discourse 
Total 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
Credibility 
Strongly 
Agree 
Count 38 1 0 0 0 39 
% of 
Nationalist 
Discourse 
27.5% 1.8% .0% .0% .0% 19.5% 
Agree Count 65 26 0 0 0 91 
% of 
Nationalist 
Discourse 
47.1% 46.4% .0% .0% .0% 45.5% 
Neutral Count 19 11 0 0 0 30 
% of 
Nationalist 
Discourse 
13.8% 19.6% .0% .0% .0% 15.0% 
Disagree Count 12 12 2 0 0 26 
% of 
Nationalist 
Discourse 
8.7% 21.4% 50.0% .0% .0% 13.0% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Count 4 6 2 1 1 14 
% of 
Nationalist 
Discourse 
2.9% 10.7% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 7.0% 
Total Count 138 56 4 1 1 200 
% of 
Nationalist 
Discourse 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table (23) Relationship between liking nationalist discourse and perceiving 
Okasha as a credible communicator 
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H2a: People who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are more likely to believe 
that political participation is important 
Overall, 92% of the sample believed that political participation is important for Egypt’s 
future (n=180). 20% did not think that political participation is important (n=20) (See 
Figure 5) 
A chi-square test was employed to test this hypotheses. The results showed that there a 
positive relationship between perceiving Tawfik Okasha to be credible and believing 
that political participation is important for Egypt’s future (p <0.001). Hence H2a was 
supported. (See table 9) 
21.7% of the respondents who believed that political participation is important for 
Egypt’ future strongly agreed that Okasha is a credible communicator, while 50.6 % of 
the respondents who thought that political participation is important agree that Okasaha 
is a credible communicator. 13.3% of the respondents who believed that political 
participation is important neither agreed nor disagreed that Okasha is credible. On the 
other hand, 10% those who said that political participation is important disagreed that 
Okasha was a credible communicator and 4.4% of those who thought that political 
participation was important strongly disagreed that Okasha is a credible communicator. 
 
Figure (9) Is political participation important for Egypt’s future? 
Yes; 92%
No; 8%
Is Political Particpation Imporant for 
Egypt's Future?
Yes No
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Is Political Participation 
important for Egypt’s future?  
Total Yes No 
Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
Credibility 
Strongly 
Agree 
Count 39 0 39 
    
Is political participation 
important? 
21.7% .0% 19.5% 
Agree Count 91 0 91 
    
Is political participation 
important? 
50.6% .0% 45.5% 
Neutral Count 24 6 30 
Is political participation 
important? 
13.3% 30.0% 15.0% 
Disagree Count 18 8 26 
Is political participation 
important? 
10.0% 40.0% 13.0% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Count 8 6 14 
Is political participation 
important? 
4.4% 30.0% 7.0% 
Total Count 180 20 200 
Is political participation 
important?  
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table (24) The relationship between perceiving Okasha as a credible 
communicator and believing that political participation is important for Egypt’s 
future  
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H2b: People who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are more likely to vote for 
the candidates he supports. 
The use of Pearson’s chi-square test showed that there is a positive relationship between 
perceiving Okasha as credible and voting for the candidates he supports (p < 0.001). 
Respondents who believe that Tawfik Okasha is a credible communicator 
overwhelmingly voted for Ahmed Shafik in the 2012 elections and intend to vote for 
Abdel Fatah Al Sisi in the upcoming presidential elections. Hence H2b is supported. 
See Tables 25 and 26. 
Table (25) The relationship between Tawfik Okasha’s credibility and voting for 
the candidate he supported in the 2012 presidential elections 
 
 
 
Tawfik Okasha’s Credibility 
Total 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Who did you vote 
for in the 2012 
presidential 
elections? 
Mohamed 
Morsi 
Count 0 2 2 10 10 24 
% Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
credibility 
.0% 2.3% 8.3% 58.8% 83.3% 13.3% 
Ahmed 
Shafik 
Count 39 83 18 6 1 147 
% Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
credibility 
100.0% 94.3% 75.0% 35.3% 8.3% 81.7% 
I annulled 
my vote 
Count 0 3 4 1 1 9 
% Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
credibility 
.0% 3.4% 16.7% 5.9% 8.3% 5.0% 
Total Count 39 88 24 17 12 180 
% Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
credibility 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table (26) The relationship between Tawfik Okasha’s credibility and voting for 
the candidates he supports in the upcoming presidential elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tawfik Okasha’s credibility 
Total 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Who are you 
going to vote 
for in the 
upcoming 
presidential 
elections? 
Hamdeen 
Sabahy 
Count 1 1 4 10 4 20 
% Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
credibility 
2.6% 1.1% 16.0% 52.6% 66.7% 11.4% 
Abdel 
Fatah Al 
Sisi 
Count 38 86 21 8 2 155 
% Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
credibility 
97.4% 98.9% 84.0% 42.1% 33.3% 88.1% 
I have not 
decide yet 
Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 
% Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
credibility 
.0% .0% .0% 5.3% .0% .6% 
Total Count 39 87 25 19 6 176 
% Tawfik 
Okasha’s 
credibility 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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H3: People who perceive Tawfik Okasha as credible are more likely to have 
participated in a protest he organized. 
Overall, 62% of the sample (n=124) reported that they have participated in a protest 
organized by Tawfik Okasha. 50% of the respondents (n=100) ratings ranged between 
Strongly Agree and Agree (See Table 27) 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare Tawfik Okasha’s credibility 
and participating in protests that he organized. The two variables turned out to have a 
significant relationship to each other (p<0.001). The mean score for Tawfik Okasha’s 
credibility among those who participated in one of his protests is 1.94, while the mean 
score for his credibility among those who did not participate is 3.35, which means that 
they do not perceive him as credible (See Table 28) 
Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Did Not 
Participate 
Total 
I am proud to 
have 
participated in a 
protest 
organized by 
Tawfik Okasha 
20 
(8.5%) 
80 
(43.5%) 
16 
(13%) 
6 
(17%) 
2 
(18%) 
76 
(38%) 
200 
(100%) 
 
Table (27) How the respondents felt about participating in a protests organized 
by Tawfik Okasha. 
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Table (28) Relationship between the mean scores of Tawfik Okasha’s credibility 
and attending a protest he organized 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number (N) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Mean 
Credibility 
means among 
the respondents 
who attended a 
protest 
organized by 
Tawfik Okasha 
124 1.9417 .61665 .05538 
Credibility 
means among 
the respondents 
who did not 
attended a 
protest 
organized by 
Tawfik Okasha 
76 3.3565 1.02506 .11758 
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H4: Compared to the rest of the educational levels, highly educated people are less 
likely to perceive Tawfik Okasha to be a credible communicator 
The perceived credibility of Tawfik Okasha differed among the different educational 
levels. The “Illiterate and Less than High school” categories were the top two categories 
in terms of perceiving Tawfik Okasha to be a credible communicator (See Table 29) 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the level of education to the 
perceived credibility of Tawfik Okasha. A significant relationship between the two 
variables was found (p<0.001). The mean score for Tawfik Okasha’s credibility among 
highly educated respondents is 2.85, while the mean score for the rest of the educational 
levels is 2.35. This means that highly educated respondents, compared to the rest of the 
educational levels, tend to be neutral about their perception of Tawfik Okasha’s 
credibility.  Hence H4 is supported. (See Table 30) 
Table (29 ) Credibility means according to the Level of Education 
 
 
 
 
Highest level of education 
completed 
     Mean N Std. Deviation 
 
Illiterate 2.1282 50 .83974 
Reads and Writes 2.6667 3 .57735 
Less than high 
school 
 
2.4081 47 1.13954 
High School 2.6364 10 .70287 
Technical 
Diploma 
2.4841 40 .85933 
Bachelor’s degree 2.8509 50 1.26192 
Total 2.4793 200 1.05117 
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Table (30) The mean scores of Tawfik Okasha’s credibility among the highly 
educated respondents Vs. The rest of the educational levels altogether 
H5: Young people who use the Internet as a primary source for political 
information do not perceive Tawfik Okasha to be a credible communicator. 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to see if there is a relationship between 
being young and using the Internet as a primary source for information on one hand 
and perceiving Tawfik Okasha to be a credible communicator. A significant 
relationship between the two groups of variables was found (p<0.001).Hence H5 is 
supported. 
(See Table 31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number (N) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Credibility 
mean among 
the respondents 
who are highly 
educated 
50 2.8509 1.26192 .17846 
Credibility 
mean among 
the respondents 
who are not 
highly educated 
150 2.3555 .94355 .07704 
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Number (N) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Tawfik Okasha’s 
credibility 
among young 
people who use 
the Internet as a 
primary source 
for information 
26 3.1538 1.33628 .26207 
Tawfik Okasha’s 
credibility 
among young 
people who do 
not use the 
Internet as a 
primary source 
for information 
80 2.4756 . 78703 .08799 
 Table (31) Tawfik Okasha’s credibility and the use of the Internet by the youth   
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings of this study show that Tawfik Okasha is a credible communicator. 
He got highly rated on the expertness and trustworthiness components and moderately 
rated on the goodwill aspect of credibility. It has been also shown that Tawfik Okasha’s 
use of nationalist discourse enhances his credibility as a communicator and also the 
persuasive effect of his message. 
 Furthermore, the study revealed that Tawfik Okasha’s credibility as a 
communicator is associated with a strong belief in the importance of political 
participation and a tendency to vote for the political candidates endorsed by Okasha. 
Another important finding is that the respondents have shown high political 
participation levels in the aftermath of the January 25th revolution. This was 
demonstrated not just through voting in the elections, but also through their 
participation in protests. Tawfik Okasha’s credibility turned out to have an effect on the 
participation of his viewers in protests. 62% of the respondents reported participating 
in one of Tawfik Okasha’s protests. This reflects that Okasha is a persuasive 
communicator. 
Education is an important variable when to it comes to the source credibility 
theory. The current study showed that Okasha’s credibility was highest among the 
illiterate respondents and lowest among the highly educated ones. Also Okasha was not 
perceived as credible by the young respondents who rely on the Internet as a primary 
source for political information.  
The findings of this study convey important things about the domain of political 
communication in Egypt. First of all, it reflects that Okasha has successfully reached 
out to a large sector in the society, which is the illiterate people. According to recent 
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statistics, 16 million Egyptians are illiterate. So logically speaking, they need a kind of 
communication that is of a simple and non-sophisticated nature. And this is what 
Okasha provided. Therefore being perceived as credible among the illiterate 
respondents reflects the success he achieved in reaching out to them. Moreover, the 
results show that television remains the top medium through which respondents rely on 
for political information. This makes sense as television enjoys high penetration rates 
with 98.8% of Egyptian households owning a television set (BBG, 2014) 
The study also highlighted the appeal of nationalist discourse to Okasha’s 
viewers. Using nationalist discourse enhanced Okasha’s credibility as a communicator, 
which in turn had an effect on the political participation tendencies of the respondents. 
The current study has also shown that source credibility theory still holds true, even in 
the age of the Internet. Expertness and trustworthiness in Okasha’s case seem to be 
related to his adoption of the “crisis communication” theory. He is always keen on 
presenting himself as a patriot who puts the interests of his country before his own. This 
positively enhanced his image as many respondents reported that they think he is an 
“honest and courageous man who fights corruption.”  
 Even the respondents who did not perceive Okasha as credible exhibited strong 
support for several elements of nationalist discourse. This highlights that when it comes 
to effective political communication in Egypt, adopting nationalist discourse seems to 
be appealing to Egyptians. It would be important to highlight that the appeal of this 
kind of discourse has to do with the critical phase that Egypt has been living in since 
the January 25th revolution. The heightened sense of patriotism and fear for the 
country’s future always accompany times of revolt. In such atmosphere, appealing to 
the nationalist sentiments of the viewers is expected to generate favorable attitudes 
toward the communicator and more importantly perhaps, the viewership rates of the 
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channel. The role of nationalist discourse in tailoring effective political communication 
messages by media professionals is undeniable, especially in post-revolution Egypt. 
However, further studies are needed to assess how the use of nationalist discourse 
impacts the credibility of the communicator and his message altogether.  
The general findings of this study support the strong role played by the media 
in fostering political participation among Egyptians. The survey results suggest that 
Tawfik Okasha played a role in enhancing the political participation of his audience 
and mobilizing them to protest on different occasions. This come in line with other 
studies that rejected Robinson’s media malaise theory. It also comes in line with 
previous research that asserts the role of the media as a force of political mobilization 
(Martin, 2008; Stromback & Shehata, 2010).  
The results also reflect the importance of source credibility theory in the field 
of political communication. Through his perceived credibility, Okasha affected the 
attitudinal and behavioral components of his viewers’ political participation. The 
attitudinal component is reflected in their belief that political participation is important 
for Egypt’s future, while the behavioral component appears in their active participation 
in elections, referendums and protests. Despite the fact that these results support what 
Okasha said about his role in providing his viewers with proper “political education”, 
it is important not to overestimate the influence of Tawfik Okasha or attribute the active 
political participation of respondents to him solely. There are other intervening factors 
that deserve to be examined by future studies.  
Another critical issue that this study dealt with is the evolving role of Egyptian 
talk show hosts, especially after the January revolution. Even though Tawfik Okasha’s 
phenomenon is unique in its nature, however it manifests the rising trend of talk show 
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hosts abandoning the values of objectivity and neutrality, and assuming the roles of 
political activists and politicians. The findings reveal that the effect of political parties 
is almost non-existent as only 4.6% of the sample said that they responded to the call 
of a political party to protest on June 30th. On the other hand, we find that Tawfik 
Okasha’s call was much more effective as 61.8% of those who participated in the June 
30th protests reported that they responded to his call. So could it be that talk show hosts 
feel the necessity to fill the void left by political parties and politicians? In the 
researcher’s interview with him, Tawfik Okasha admitted that considers himself the 
leader of the June 30th revolution as he was able to mobilize people to protest and end 
the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. He even attributed the success of grassroots 
movement “Tamarrod” in gathering petitions to his relentless efforts.  
The majority of Egyptian talk show hosts believe that it is impossible to 
maintain an impartial stance under the current circumstances. They strongly believe in 
the importance of their role in shaping the public opinion. Furthermore and as illustrated 
by El Issawi (2013), they think that maintaining a neutral stance at this moment will be 
an act of treason. They also think that the audience is always eager to hear what they 
have to say. Therefore, it can be said that Tawfik Okasha’s case is part of a bigger 
phenomenon that has prevailed among Egyptian talk show hosts. The findings also 
suggest that the youth rely on the Internet as their main source for political information. 
That might be one of the reasons that made talk show hosts deviate from their traditional 
roles and adopt new ones in order to appeal to young people and restore their faith in 
the traditional media once again.  
 This opens the door for a long debate about the effect of such change in the 
traditional role of television presenters. First of all, it poses questions about how healthy 
this phenomenon is in the long run. Even if the justifications given by talk show hosts 
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are acceptable for the time being, they might not be valid in the future. Media experts 
say that Egypt is heading toward having a public broadcasting system similar to the 
BBC. Egypt’s new constitution has an article that stipulates the establishment of a 
“Supreme Council for the Regulation of Media”.  
According to Article (211), “The Council shall bear the responsibility for 
guaranteeing and protecting the freedom of press  and media as stipulated in the 
Constitution, safeguarding its independence, neutrality, plurality  and diversity, 
preventing monopolistic practices, monitoring the legality of the sources of  funding of 
press and media institutions and developing the controls and criteria necessary to  
ensure compliance by the press and media outlets with the professional and ethical 
standards,  and national security needs as stated in the Law.”. The council will be the 
main regulatory body for all media practices in Egypt. The article also speaks about 
ensuring that all media outlets comply with the professional ethical standards. If such a 
rule is strictly applied, the phenomenon of talk show hosts turning into political activists 
might be put to an end. 
Nimmo and Newsomne (1997) argued that the social role of the professional 
communicator emerged as one of the consequences of the Industrial Revolution. The 
same can be applied to the phenomenon of Tawfik Okasha. He rose to prominence 
mainly because he appeared at a critical juncture in Egypt’s history; that is the January 
25th revolution. His phenomenon evolved due to the political and social changes 
brought about by the revolution. The political fluidity that followed the collapse of 
Muabark’s regime gave Tawfik Okasha’s talk show an unprecedented margin of 
freedom. Such freedom allowed him to present himself as a political commentator 
“wrapped in the cloaks of sages” according to Nimmo and Newsome’s description. In 
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sum, the dramatic social and political changes that Egypt witnessed during the past 
three years have contributed to shaping Tawfik Okaha’s credibility.  
5.2 Limitations of the current study: 
 The main limitation of this study had to do with the sample selection. A quota 
sample, despite its many advantages, is a non-probability sample that cannot 
be used to generalize the results. Therefore the study lacks external validity. 
  Due to cost and time considerations, the researcher could not go beyond 
Greater Cairo and Giza in the selection of participants. This is also one of the 
limitations as a substantial portion of Okasha’s viewers reside in rural areas. 
Another limitation had to do with the survey method itself. The researcher had 
to limit the number of questions because respondents usually do not want to 
spend a lot of time answering surveys. Including more than one open-ended 
questions would have provided more in-depth data about Tawfik Okasha. 
Nevertheless, the survey questions covered almost all aspects of the Okasha 
phenomenon.  
 Finally, the overwhelming majority of the sample consisted of males and 
therefore the female perspective was not present. It is important because the 
political participation levels of women has surged during the past 3 years.  
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5.3 Recommendations for future studies: 
 The current study used a quota sample based on education. Future studies 
could integrate more variables such as age, socioeconomic status, and gender. 
They could compare how Tawfik Okasha is perceived by different strata of the 
society.  
 There was a trace of the third-person effect in the results. Therefore, future 
studies could examine the existence of such effect and how it impacts the 
political attitudes and behavior of the viewers.  
 It would be valuable if a comprehensive study is conducted, that not only 
examines the impact of Tawfik Okasha’s credibility, but also several other 
prominent Egyptian talk show hosts like Ibrahim Eissa, Lamees El Hadidy, 
Mahmoud Saad and Yousri Fouda. Other media effects theories such as the 
agenda setting theory can also be applied. 
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APPENDIX (A) 
English version of Survey 
 
 
Documentation of Informed Consent for Participation in Research Study 
 
Project Title: [The Relationship between Source Credibility and Political 
Participation: Examining the Egyptian Talk Show “Masr Al Yom” broadcast 
on Al Faraeen Satellite Channel] 
Principal Investigator: Riham Ibrahim 
E-mail: rihamibrahim@aucegypt.edu 
*You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of the 
research is to examine the credibility of Egyptian Talk Show “Masr Al Yom 
broadcast on Al Faraeen Satellite Channel, and the findings may be presented.  
The expected duration of your participation is 10-15 minutes. 
The procedures of the research will be as follows: 
You are kindly asked to complete a questionnaire that consists of 21 questions.  
Your contribution will be of great value for this study. Thank you in advance for 
your time and cooperation. 
*There will not be certain risks or discomforts associated with this research.  
*There [will not be] benefits to you from this research.  
*The information you provide for purposes of this research is confidential.  
*If you have any further inquiries regarding your participation in this research, 
please contact me.  
rihamibrahim@aucegypt.edu 
*Participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may 
discontinue participation at any time without penalty or the loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. 
Signature   ________________________________________ 
Printed Name  ________________________________________ 
Date   _______________________________________ 
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Please circle the answer that best applies to you: 
1. What is your main source for political information? Please choose only one 
*Newspapers 
*Television 
*Internet 
*Radio 
*Family or friends 
*Other, please specify____________ 
2. How many hours do you spend watching T.V daily? 
*Less than an hour 
* More than an hour –2 hours 
*More than 2 hours – 3 hours 
*More than 3hours- 4 hours 
*More than 4 hours 
3. How many hours do you spend watching T.V. talk shows daily? 
*Less than an hour 
* More than an hour –2 hours 
*More than 2 hours – 3 hours 
*More than 3hours- 4 hours 
*More than 4 hours 
*Occasionally 
4. How often do you watch Tawfik Okasha's talk show "Masr Al Yom" on Al- 
Faraeen channel? 
*Every Day 
*4 to 6 times a week 
*2 to 3 times a week 
*Once a week 
*Occasionally 
*I do not know who Tawfik Okasha is (Please terminate the survey. Thank you for your time)  
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5. These are statements about T.V talk show host Tawfik 
Okasha. Please select one choice for each statement: 
Statement Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
1- “Masr Al Yom” talk show is a 
reliable source for information  
1 2 3 4 5 
2- “Masr Al Yom” talk show is 
knowledgeable about politics  
1 2 3 4 5 
3- “Masr Al Yom” talk show has the 
ability to make accurate 
predictions about the future  
1 2 3 4 5 
4- I think that the presenters of 
“Masr Al Yom” talk show are 
highly intelligent  
1 2 3 4 5 
5- I believe that “Masr Al Yom” talk 
show is honest in its presentation 
of facts  
1 2 3 4 5 
6- I think that the presenters of 
“Masr Al Yom” talk show are 
patriotic 
1 2 3 4 5 
7- I think that “Masr Al Yom” talk 
show is genuinely concerned about 
the welfare of the Egyptian nation  
1 2 3 4 5 
8- I think that “Masr Al Yom” talk 
show is politically independent  
1 2 3 4 5 
9- I identify with “Masr Al Yom” 
talk show on many levels 
1 2 3 4 5 
10- I feel that “Masr Al Yom” talk 
show is concerned about my well-
being  
1 2 3 4 5 
11- I think that “Masr Al Yom” talk 
show understands my needs and 
respects my values   
1 2 3 4 5 
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12- I believe that what happened on 
the 25th of January, 2011 was a 
real revolution 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Statement Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
13- I believe that what happened on 
the 30th of June, 2013 was a real 
revolution 
1 2 3 4 5 
14- I believe that Egypt has many 
enemies who are still conspiring 
against its stability 
1 2 3 4 5 
15- I believe in the existence of a fifth-
column in Egypt   
1 2 3 4 5 
16- I am ready to fight and die for my 
country's sake  
1 2 3 4 5 
17- I am proud to have participated in 
protests organized by “Masr Al 
Yom” talk show 
1 2 3 4 5 
18- I voted for a particular candidate 
because “Masr Al Yom” talk show 
endorsed him  
1 2 3 4 5 
19- I intend to work in the political 
campaign of one of the candidates 
because “Masr Al Yom” talk show 
supports him  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6.  Do you think that political participation is important for Egypt's future? 
*Yes, it is important 
*No, it is not important 
7. Did you vote in the 2012 presidential elections? 
*Yes (Please proceed to the next question) 
*No (Please go to Question 9) 
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8. Who did you vote for? 
___________________________________ 
 
9. Did you participate in the January 2014 constitutional referendum? 
*Yes (Please proceed to the next question) 
*No (Skip the next question) 
10. Did you vote in favor of the constitution or against it? 
*In favor of the constitution (Yes) 
*Against the constitution (No) 
11. Did you participate in the protests of the January 25th revolution?  
*Yes (Please proceed to the next question) 
 *No (Skip the next question) 
12. Did you participate in the protests of the June 30th revolution? 
*Yes (Please proceed to the next question) 
 *No (Skip the next question) 
13. What is the political entity that you responded to it its call for protesting on 
the 30th of June? 
*A political party 
*Tamarrod 
*“Masr Al Yom” talk show 
*Other, please specify __________________ 
14. Are you going to participate in the upcoming presidential elections? 
*Yes I participated (Please proceed to the next question) 
 *No (Please go to Question 16)  
*Still not sure (Please go to Question 16) 
15. If yes, who are you going to vote for? 
_______________________________________ 
16. Do you have anything else that you would like to say about “Masr Al Yom” 
talk show? 
_____________________________________ 
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Personal Information 
17. Gender: 
*Male 
*Female 
18. Age: 
*18-21 years old 
*22-35 years old 
*36-50 years old 
*51-60 years old 
*Older than 60 years old 
19. Highest level of education completed: 
*Illiterate  
*Reads and writes 
*Less than high school (primary or elementary school) 
*High school   
*Technical diploma 
*Bachelor’s degree  
*Post graduate degree 
20.Employment status: 
* Employed   
*Unemployed 
*Freelancer 
21.Monthly Income: 
*Less than 500 L.E 
*500-1000 L.E 
*1000-2000 L.E 
*2000 -3000 L.E 
*Over 3000 L.E 
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 yevruS fo noisrev cibarA
  
  دراسة بحثية للمشاركة في استمارة موافقة مسبقة
 
 
 مصر امجبرن تأثير مصداقية المصدر علي المشاركة السياسية بالتطبيق علي( عنوان البحث : 
 )الفراعين قناة علي المذاع اليوم
 ريهام إبراهيم عبد الرؤوف: الباحث الرئيسي
  ude.tpygecua@miharbimahir: البريد الالكتروني
 
عو للمشاركة فى دراسة بحثية عن مدي تأثير مصداقية المصدر علي المشاركة السياسية انت مد
 الفراعين قناة علي المذاع اليوم مصر برنامجحيث يتم فحص 
 
 الفراعين قناة علي المذاع اليوم مصر برنامج التعرف علي تأثير مصداقية هو هدف الدراسة  
 لمشاهديه علي المشاركة السياسية
 
 سريةنتائج البحث  
 
 )دقيقة  01-51للمشاركة فى هذا البحث (  المدة المتوقعة
 
 اجراءات الدراسة 
 علي المذاع اليوم مصر برنامجسؤال عن  16 ه الاستمارة التي تحتوي عليذبرجاء ملء ه
ائدة ا البحث له فذوتأثيره علي المشاركة السياسية لمشاهديه. إن مشاركتك في هالفراعين  قناة
 .كبيرة للدراسة التي أقوم بها. شكرا ًجزيلا ًلوقتك وتعاونك معي
 ا فى هذا البحث سوف تكون سرية.: المعلومات التى ستدلى بهالسرية واحترام الخصوصية
 
" أي أسئلة متعلقة بهذه الدراسة أو حقوق المشاركين فيها أوعند حدوث أى  اصابات ناتجة 
  ude.tpygecua@miharbimahir هام إبراهيميعن هذه المشاركة يجب ان توجه الى ر
ان المشاركة فى هذه الدراسة ماهى الا عمل تطوعى, حيث أن الامتناع عن المشاركة لايتضمن 
أى عقوبات أو فقدان أى مزايا تحق لك. ويمكنك أيضا التوقف عن المشاركة فى أى وقت من 
 دون عقوبة أو فقدان لهذه المزايا. 
 
 .........: .................................................الامضاء
 
 : ................................................... اسم المشارك
 
 /................/.............: ......... التاريخ
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.ما هو المصدر الرئيسي الذي تعتمد عليه للحصول علي المعلومات الخاصة بالسياسة؟ 1
 (برجاء اختيار وسيلة واحد فقط)
 الصحف*
 التليفزيون*
 *الإنترنت
 *الراديو
 *العائلة والأصدقاء
 مصدر آخر. برجاء ذكره*
 .كم ساعة تقضيها في مشاهدة التليفزيون يوميا ً؟2
 أقل من ساعة*
 من ساعة إلي أقل من ساعتين*
 أقل من ثلاث ساعات*من ساعتين إلي 
 من ثلاث ساعات إلي أقل من أربعة ساعات
 أكثر من أربعة ساعات*
 في مشاهدة البرامج الحوارية (التوك شو) يومياً؟. كم ساعة تقضيها 3
 أقل من ساعة*
 من ساعة إلي أقل من ساعتين*
 أقل من ثلاث ساعات*من ساعتين إلي 
 من ثلاث ساعات إلي أقل من أربعة ساعات
 أكثر من أربعة ساعات*
 *لا أشاهدها 
 الفراعين؟.كم مرة تشاهد برنامج "مصر اليوم" الذي يقدمه توفيق عكاشة علي قناة 4
 *يوميا  
 مرات أسبوعيا   6-4*من 
 *من مرتين إلي ثلاثة أسبوعيا  
 *مرة واحدة أسبوعيا  
   *أشاهده بشكل متقطع
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لا أعرف هذا البرنامج ولا مقدمه توفيق عكاشة (شكرا  جزيلا  لوقتك. برجاء عدم اكمال *
 الاستبيان)
أرجو  ,الفراعين قناة علي المذاع اليوم مصر برنامجب. هذه مجموعة من العبارات تتعلق 5
 معرفة رأيك فيها:
  
معارض 
 بشدة
 
 معارض
 
 محايد
 
 
 
 أوافق
 
 
أوافق 
 بشدة
 
 
 
 العبارة
برنامج مصر اليوم  يعتبر. 1 1 2 3 4 5 
 المذاع علي قناة الفراعين
 مصدر موثوق للمعلومات
برنامج مصر اليوم . 2 1 2 3 4 5 
 المذاع علي قناة الفراعين
 يتمتع بثقافة سياسية عالية
برنامج مصر اليوم  .3 1 2 3 4 5 
 المذاع علي قناة الفراعين
لديه القدرة علي التنبؤ بدقة 
 بالأحداث المستقبلية
برنامج  مقدمي أعتقد أن.4 1 2 3 4 5 
مصر اليوم المذاع علي قناة 
بذكاء  ونيتمتع الفراعين
 حاد
برنامج مصر أري أن .5 1 2 3 4 5 
اليوم المذاع علي قناة 
يعرض الحقائق  الفراعين
 بأمانة وموضوعية
برنامج مصر أري أن .6 1 2 3 4 5 
اليوم المذاع علي قناة 
 وطني  برنامج الفراعين
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. أعتقد أن برنامج مصر 7              1 2 3 4 5
 اليوم المذاع علي قناة الفراعين
 مهتم حقا ُ     بمصلحة مصر
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معارض 
 بشدة
 
 معارض
 
 محايد
 
 
 
 أوافق
 
 
أوافق 
 بشدة
 
 
 العبارة
برنامج مصر أري أن . 8 1 2 3 4 5 
اليوم المذاع علي قناة 
مستقل سياسيا ً(لا  الفراعين
ينتمي لأي جهة أوحزب 
 سياسي)
برنامج مصر أشعر بأن . 9 1 2 3 4 5 
اليوم المذاع علي قناة 
يشبهني في أشياء  الفراعين
 كثيرة
برنامج مصر أشعر بأن .11 1 2 3 4 5 
اليوم المذاع علي قناة 
مهتم بمصلحتي  الفراعين
 الشخصية كمواطن 
برنامج مصر أعتقد أن .11 1 2 3 4 5 
اليوم المذاع علي قناة 
لديه علم  الفراعين
باحتياجاتي كمواطن ولديه 
احترام لمبادئي وقيمي 
 الشخصية
يناير ثورة  52أري أن .21 1 2 3 4 5 
 شعبية حقيقية
يونيو ثورة  13أري أن .31 1 2 3 4 5 
 شعبية حقيقية
أعتقد أن مصر لديها .41 1 2 3 4 5 
أعداء مازالوا يتآمرون 
 علي استقرارها
أنا أعتقد بوجود طابور .51 1 2 3 4 5 
 خامس داخل مصر
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أنا مستعد للقتال .61 1 2 3 4 5
 مصر والموت من أجل
  
معارض 
 بشدة
 
 معارض
 
 محايد
 
 
 
 أوافق
 
 
أوافق 
 بشدة
 
 العبارة
لا 
ينطبق 
 علي
أشعر بالفخر لأنني .71 1 2 3 4 5
شاركت في مظاهرة نظمها 
برنامج مصر اليوم المذاع 
 علي قناة الفراعين
قمت بالتصويت لصالح .81 1 2 3 4 5 
برنامج مصر مرشح لأن 
اليوم المذاع علي قناة 
 أظهر مساندته له الفراعين
أنوي القيام بالعمل في .91 1 2 3 4 5 
الحملة الانتخابية للسيسي 
برنامج مصر اليوم لأن 
 المذاع علي قناة الفراعين
 
.هل تظن أن المشاركة في العملية السياسية  مهم لمستقبل البلاد؟ (مثال: التصويت في 6
 الانتخابات والاستفتاءات, العمل في حملة أحد المرشحين....الخ) 
 نعم, المشاركة مهمة*
 لا, المشاركة ليست مهمة*
  محايد*
 ؟2112.هل شاركت في الانتخابات الرئاسية التي جرت في صيف 7
 نتقل إلي السؤال التالي)(ا نعم*
 )9(انتقل إلي سؤال رقم  لا*
  
 .من هو المرشح الذي أعطيته صوتك؟8
 ___________________________________
 )؟4112.هل شاركت في الاستفتاء علي الدستور هذا العام (يناير 9
 نعم (انتقل إلي السؤال التالي)*
 621
 
 )11لا (انتقل إلي سؤال رقم *
 
 بالتصويت بنعم أم بلا في الاستفتاء؟.هل قمت 11
 نعم*
 لا*
 ؟1112. هل شاركت في مظاهرات ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير 11
 نعم, شاركت *
 * لا, لم أشترك
 ؟3112يونيو  13. هل شاركت في مظاهرات ثورة 21
 *نعم شاركت (انتقل إلي السؤال التالي)
 )41*لا لم أشترك (انتقل إلي سؤال رقم 
؟ (يمكنك اختيار يونيو 13هي الجهة التي استجبت لدعوتها من أجل التظاهر يوم  . ما31
  اجابتين)
 حزب سياسي*
 تمرد*
 الفراعين قناة علي المذاع اليوم مصر برنامج *
 آخري. يرجي ذكرها____________*
 
 . هل ستقوم بالتصويت في الانتخابات الرئاسية القادمة؟41
 (انتقل إلي السؤال التالي) نعم*
 )61(انتقل إلي سؤال رقم  لا*
 )61لم أقرر بعد (انتقل إلي سؤال رقم *
 
 .إذا كنت تنوي المشاركة, فمن المرشح الذي ستصوت لصالحه؟51
 __________________________________________
 ؟ الفراعين قناة علي المذاع اليوم مصر برنامج.هل لديك أي شيء آخر تود قوله عن 61
     -----------------------------------------------------------
 721
 
 المعلومات الشخصية:
 .الجنس71
 *أنثي    ذكر*
 .الفئة العمرية81
 عام 11-11*
 عام 35-11*
 عام 53-65*
 عام 56-13*
 عام56*أكبر من 
 .مستوي التعليم91
   *غير متعلم
 *يقرأ ويكتب
 أو إعدادية شهادة ابتدائية* 
 *الثانوية العامة 
 دبلوم فني *
 حاصل علي شهادة جامعية عليا  *
 .المهنة:12
 أعمال حرة*  *لايعمل   _______: يعمل في مهنة وهي*
 الدخل الشهري.12
 جنيه  553أقل من *
 جنيه  5551-553*من 
 جنيه 5551-5551*من 
 جنيه 5555-5551*من 
 جنيه 5555*أكثر من 
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